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Abstract
As multi-hospital kidney exchange clearinghouses have grown, the set of players has
grown from patients and surgeons to include hospitals. Hospitals have the option of en-
rolling only their hard-to-match patient-donor pairs, while conducting easily arranged
exchanges internally. This behavior has already started to be observed.
We show that the cost of making it individually rational for hospitals to participate
fully is low in almost every large exchange pool (although the worst-case cost is very
high), while the cost of failing to guarantee individually rational allocations could be
large, in terms of lost transplants. We also identify an incentive compatible mechanism.
1 Introduction
When kidney exchange was just beginning, most exchanges were conducted in single hospi-
tals, or in closely connected networks of hospitals like the fourteen New England transplant
centers organized by the New England Program for Kidney Exchange (Roth et al. (2005a)).
But today exchanges often involve multiple hospitals that may have relatively little repeated
interaction outside of kidney exchange. The present paper is meant to help establish a the-
oretical framework to study the kinds of problems that can be anticipated as the United
States moves in the direction of nationally organized exchange, as it has begun to do in
2010.
∗Ashlagi: iashlagi@mit.edu. Roth: al roth@harvard.edu. We have had valuable conversations about
this paper with Itay Fainmesser, Duncan Gilchrist, Jacob Leshno, and Mike Rees, and have benefited from
comments by participants at the NBER Market Design conference and the Harvard-MIT Economic Theory
seminar.
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In particular, this paper concerns the growing problem of giving hospitals the incentive
to participate fully, in order to achieve the gains that kidney exchange on a large scale makes
possible. Our results suggest that, if care is taken in how kidney exchange mechanisms are
organized, the problems of participation may be less troubling in large exchange programs
than they are starting to be in multi-hospital exchanges as presently organized.
1.1 Background
Kidney transplantation is the treatment of choice for end stage renal disease, but there
are many more people in need of kidneys than there are kidneys available. Kidneys for
transplantation can come from deceased donors, or from live donors (since healthy people
have two kidneys and can remain healthy with one). However not everyone who is healthy
enough to donate a kidney and wishes to do so can donate a kidney to his or her intended
recipient, since a successful transplant requires that donor and recipient be compatible, in
blood and tissue types. This raises the possibility of kidney exchange, in which two or
more incompatible patient-donor pairs exchange kidneys, with each patient in the exchange
receiving a compatible kidney from another patient’s donor.1
Note that it is illegal for organs for transplantation to be bought or sold in the United
States and throughout much of the world (see Roth (2007) and Lieder and Roth (2010)).
Kidney exchange thus represents an attempt to organize a barter economy on a large scale,
with the aid of a computer-assisted clearinghouse.2
The first kidney exchange in the United States was carried out in 2000 at the Rhode
Island Hospital, between two of the hospital’s own incompatible patient-donor pairs.3 Roth
et al. (2004) made an initial proposal for organizing kidney exchange on a large scale, which
included the ability to integrate cycles and chains, and considered the incentives that well
designed allocation mechanisms would give to participating patients and their surgeons to re-
veal relevant information about patients. The surgical infrastructure available in 2004 meant
that only pairwise exchanges (between exactly two incompatible patient donor pairs) could
initially be considered, and Roth et al. (2005b) proposed a mechanism for accomplishing this,
1In addition to such cyclic exchanges, chains are also possible, which involve not only incompatible patient
donor pairs, and begin with a deceased donor or an undirected donor (one without a particular intended
recipient), and end with a patient with high priority on the deceased donor waiting list, or with a donor who
will donate at a future time.
2Recall that Jevons (1876) proposed that precisely the difficulties of organizing barter economies–in
particular, the difficulty of satisfying the ”double coincidence” of wants involved in simultaneous exchange
without money–had led to the invention of money.
3For an account of this and other early events in kidney exchange see Roth (2010), ”The first kidney ex-
change in the U.S., and other accounts of early progress,” http://marketdesigner.blogspot.com/2010/04/first-
kidney-exchange-in-us-and-other.html
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again paying close attention to the incentives for patients and their surgeons to participate
straightforwardly. As kidney exchanges organized around these principles gained experience,
Saidman et al. (2006) and Roth et al. (2007b) showed that efficiency gains could be achieved
by incorporating chains and larger exchanges that required only relatively modest additional
surgical infrastructure, and today there is growing use of larger exchanges and longer chains,
particularly following the publication of Rees et al. (2009).
Roth et al. (2005a) describe the formation of the New England Program for Kidney
Exchange (NEPKE) under the direction of Dr. Frank Delmonico, and these proposals were
also instrumental in helping organize the Alliance for Paired Donation (APD) under the
direction of Dr Mike Rees.4 In 2010 a National Kidney Paired Donation Pilot Program
became operational, still on a very small scale.5
During the initial startup period, there was some evidence that attention to the incentives
of patients and their surgeons to reveal information was important. But as infrastructure has
developed, the information contained in blood tests has come to be conducted and reported
in a more standard manner (sometimes at a centralized testing facility), reducing some of
the choice about what information to report, with what accuracy. So some strategic issues
have become less important over time (and indeed the current practice at both APD and
NEPKE does not deal with the provision of information that derives from blood tests as an
incentive issue). However, as kidney exchange has become more widespread, and as multi-
hospital exchange consortia have been formed and a national exchange is being explored,
the “players” are not just (and perhaps not even) patients and their surgeons, but hospitals
(or directors of transplant centers). And as kidney exchange is practiced on a wider scale,
free riding has become possible, with hospitals having the option of participating in one or
more kidney exchange networks but also of withholding some of their patient-donor pairs,
or some of their non-directed donors, and enrolling those of their patient-donor pairs who
are hardest to match, while conducting more easily arranged exchanges internally. Some of
this behavior is already observable.
The present paper considers the ‘kidney exchange game’ with hospitals as the players,
to clarify the issues currently facing hospitals in existing multi-hospital exchange consortia,
and those that would face hospitals in a large-scale national kidney exchange program.
4Today, in addition to those two large kidney exchange clearinghouses, kidney exchange is practiced by
a growing number of hospitals and formal and informal consortia (see Roth (2008)). Computer scientists
have become involved, and an algorithm of Abraham, Blum, and Sandholm (2007) designed to handle large
populations was briefly used in the APD, and algorithms of that sort may form the basis of a national
exchange.
5The national pilot program ran two pilot matches in October and December of 2010. Under its initial
guidelines, only exchanges are considered, not chains.
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1.2 Individual rationality
Hospitals participate in a multi-center exchange by reporting a list of incompatible patient-
donor pairs to a central clearinghouse, and a matching mechanism chooses which exchanges
to carry out.6 At the same time, some hospitals conduct exchanges only internally among
their own patients, and even hospitals participating in multi-center exchange programs may
conduct some internal exchanges, and may participate in more than one exchange program.
To see why it is important to have hospitals participate in centralized exchange, we ran
a simulation to compare the number of transplants that can be done when each hospital
conducts only internal exchanges (consisting of pairs only from the same hospital) with
the number of transplants a centralized mechanism can potentially produce given that it
has access to all incompatible pairs.7 The efficiency gains from centralization grow as the
number of (moderate sized) hospitals increases: for two hospitals having around 11 pairs each,
centralized kidney exchange can potentially increase transplants by about 50% compared to
the internal exchanges that could be accomplished, but this rises to an increase of almost
300% when we consider 22 hospitals with an average of 11 pairs each (see also Toulis and
Parkes (2010) who analytically quantify the benefit from a centralized clearinghouse for
organizing 2-way exchange).
However when kidney exchange clearinghouses try to maximize the (weighted) number of
transplants without attention to whether those transplants are internal to a hospital, it may
not be individually rational for a hospital to contribute those pairs it can match internally
(cf. Roth 2008).8 For example, consider a hospital a with two pairs, a1 and a2, that it can
6NEPKE initially organized the fourteen transplant centers in New England (cf. Roth et al. (2005a))
and now includes several others, and the APD now counts as members several dozen hospitals around the
country (with varying degrees of participation).
7We briefly explain here the Monte-Carlo simulations.
To generate incompatible pairs we use a method similar to Saidman et al. (2006). First we create a patient
and donor with blood-types drawn from the national distributions as reported by Roth et al. (2007b).
Blood type compatibility is not sufficient for transplantation. Each patient is also assigned a percentage
reactive antibody (PRA) level also drawn from a distribution as in Roth et al. (2007b). Patient PRA is
interpreted as the probability of a positive crossmatch (tissue type incompatibility) with a random donor. If
the generated pair is compatible, i.e. if they are both blood type compatible and have a negative crossmatch,
they are discarded (this captures the fact that compatible pairs go directly to transplantation). Otherwise
the population generation continues until each hospital accumulates a certain number of incompatible pairs.
In our simulations the number of incompatible pairs for each hospital is drawn from a discrete uniform
distribution on [8, 14]. For each generated population we ran 500 trials.
When allowing 3-way exchanges, finding an allocation that maximizes the number of matches is an NP
hard problem (see Abraham et al. (2007) and Biro et al. (2009)). The compatibility graph is generally sparse
enough however that the problem is tractable in reasonably sized populations.
8Some weighted matching algorithms currently in use put some weight on internal exchanges, but this
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match internally. Suppose it enters those two pairs in a centralized exchange. It may be
that the weighted number of transplants is maximized by including a1 in an exchange but
not a2, in which case only one of hospital a’s patients will be transplanted, when it could
have performed two transplants on its own.
This is becoming a visible problem, as membership in a kidney exchange network does
not mean that a hospital does not also do some internal exchanges. Mike Rees, the director
of the APD, writes (personal communication):
“...competing matches at home centers is becoming a real problem. Unless
it is mandated, I’m not sure we will be able to create a national system. I
think we need to model this concept to convince people of the value of playing
together”.
This paper attempts to understand the problem raised by the APD director. We will see
that when the number of hospitals and incompatible pairs is small, it may be costly (in terms
of lost transplants) for a centralized clearinghouse to guarantee hospitals individual ratio-
nality, compared to how many transplants could be accomplished if all pairs were submitted
to a centralized exchange despite no guarantee of individual rationality. However in large
markets we will show that this cost becomes very low, and we begin to explore incentive
compatible mechanisms for achieving full participation by hospitals as efficiently as possible.
2 Kidney Exchange and Individual Rationality
2.1 Exchange pools
An exchange pool consists of a set of patient-donor pairs. A patient p and a donor d are
compatible if patient p can receive the kidney of donor d and incompatible otherwise. It
is assumed that every pair in the pool is incompatible.9 Thus a pair is a tuple v = (p, d) in
which donor d is willing to donate his kidney to patient p but p and d are incompatible. We
further assume that each donor and each patient belong to a single pair.
An exchange pool V induces a compatibility graph D(V ) = D(V,E(V )) which cap-
tures the compatibilities between donors and patients as follows: the set of nodes is V , and
for every pair of nodes u, v ∈ V , (u, v) is an edge in the graph if and only if the donor of
does not solve the problem, since it neither guarantees a hospital the exchanges it could conduct internally,
nor does it guarantee that the pairs that could be internally exchanged will be used efficiently if submitted
to the central clearinghouse.
9Pairs that are compatible would presently go directly to transplantation and not join the exchange pool
(but see e.g. Roth et al. (2005a) on the advantages of changing this policy).
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node u is compatible with the patient of node v. We will use the terms nodes and pairs
interchangeably.
An exchange can now be described through a cycle in the graph. Thus an exchange in
V is a cycle in D(V ), i.e. a list v1, v2, . . . , vk for some k ≥ 2 such that for every i, 1 ≤ i < k,
(vi, vi+1) ∈ E(V ) and (vk, v1) ∈ E(V ). The size of an exchange is the number of nodes in
the cycle. An allocation in V is a set of distinct exchanges in D(V ) such that each node
belongs to at most one exchange. Since in practice the size of an exchange is limited (mostly
due to logistical constraints), we assume there is an exogenous maximum size limit k > 0
for any exchange. Thus if k = 3 only exchanges of size 2 and 3 can be conducted.10
Let M be an allocation in V . We say that node v is matched by M if there exists an
exchange in M that includes v. For any set of nodes V ′ ⊆ V let M(V ′) be the set of all
nodes in V ′ that are matched (or “covered”) by M .
We will be interested in finding efficient allocations, that have as many transplants as
possible. Two types of efficiency will be considered. M is called k-efficient if it matches
the maximum number of transplants possible for exchanges of size no more than k, i.e.
there exists no other allocation M ′ consisting of exchanges of size no more than k such that
|M ′(V )| > |M(V )|.11 M is called k-maximal if there exists no such allocation M ′ such
that M ′(V ) ) M(V ). A matching will be called efficient (or maximal) if it is k-efficient
(or k-maximal) for unbounded k, i.e. for no limit on how many transplants can be included
in an exchange. Note that every k-efficient allocation is also k-maximal. The converse is
not true. However for k = 2, both types of efficiency coincide, since the collection of sets of
simultaneously matched nodes in allocations forms a matroid (see Edmonds et al. (1971)).
A Kidney Exchange Program (or simply a Kidney Exchange) consists of a set of n
hospitals Hn = {h1, . . . , hn} and a set of incompatible pairs Vh for each hospital h ∈ Hn.
We let VHn = ∪h∈HnVh. The compatibility graph induced by VHn is called the underlying
graph. We will take the hospitals (e.g. the director of transplantation at each hospital) as
the active decision makers in the Kidney Exchange, whose choices are which incompatible
pairs to reveal to the Exchange. We will approximate the preferences of hospitals as being
concerned only with their own patients. Mostly we will assume hospitals are concerned
only with the number of their patients who receive transplants, although we do not rule out
hospitals having preferences over which of their patients are transplanted.
An exchange and that matches only pairs from the same hospital is called internal.
10In the APD and NEPKE k was originally set to 2, was increased to 3, and now optimization is conducted
over even larger exchanges and chains, and the pilot national program considers exchanges up to size 3.
Exchanges are generally conducted simultaneously, so an exchange of size k requires 2k operating rooms and
surgical teams for the k nephrectomies (kidney removals) and k transplants.
11In graph theory a 2-efficient allocation is referred to as a maximum matching.
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Hospital h can match a set of pairs Bh ⊆ Vh internally if there exists an allocation in Vh
such that all nodes in Bh are matched.
2.2 Participation constraints: individual rationality for hospitals
The kidney exchange setting invites discussions of various types of individual rationality (IR).
In this paper an allocation is not individually rational if some hospital can internally match
more pairs than the number of its pairs matched in the allocation. Formally, an allocation
M in VHn is not individually rational if there exists a hospital h and an allocation Mh in
Vh such that |M(Vh)| < |Mh(Vh)|.12
To illustrate this, consider the compatibility graph in Figure 1, where nodes a1 and a2
belong to hospital a and b1 and b2 belong to hospital b. The only individually rational
allocation is the one that matches a1 and a2.
Remark : Throughout this paper, undirected edges represent two directed edges, one in each
direction.
Figure 1: No 3-efficient allocation is individually rational.
In the next section we study worst case efficiency loss from choosing IR allocations.
3 IR and Efficiency: Worst case results for compati-
bility graphs
By choosing the individually rational allocation in Figure 1 we obtain 2 transplants whereas
the efficient allocation provides 3. The following result shows that a maximum individually
rational allocation can be very costly in the worst case:
12Other formulations of individual rationality may be appropriate under some circumstances, such as
requiring not merely that a hospital be allocated the same number of transplants that it can achieve on its
own, but that it can be guaranteed to transplant a set that includes all the individuals it could match on its
own.
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Theorem 3.1. For every k ≥ 3, there exists a compatibility graph such that no k-maximal
allocation which is also individually rational matches more than 1
k−1 of the number of nodes
matched by a k-efficient allocation. Furthermore in every compatibility graph the size of a
k-maximal allocation is at least 1
k−1 times the size of a k-efficient allocation.
Proof. Let V be a set of nodes and let M be a k-efficient allocation and M ′ be a k-maximal
individually rational allocation in V . Since M ′ is k-maximal, every exchange in M must
intersect an exchange in M ′ (otherwise a disjoint exchange could be added to M ′, contra-
dicting maximality). Fix an exchange c with size 2 ≤ l ≤ k in M ′. The maximum number of
nodes that might be covered by M and not M ′ would be achieved if for each such exchange
c, M contains l− 1 exchanges each of size k, which each intersect exactly one node of c (and
M ′). (Note that if all l nodes of c were in such exchanges then M ′ wouldn’t be maximal.)
For each such exchange c, M matches (l − 1)k nodes and M ′ matches l nodes, so the ratio
is l/(l − 1)k, which is minimized at 1/(k − 1) when l = k, giving the desired bound.
Figure 2: Worst case efficiency loss from choosing an individually rational allocation (k = 3).
To see that the bound is tight, observe that the construction used to find the bound
achieves it: fix some hospital a with k vertices, and suppose that a has a single internal
exchange consisting of all of its pairs (see Figure 2 for an illustration for k = 3). The bound
1
k−1 is obtained by letting the k-efficient allocation in the underlying graph consists of exactly
k − 1 exchanges each of size k, at which a single pair of a is part of each such exchange.
That is, the efficient allocation matches all but one of hospital a’s pairs, each in exchanges
of size k with k − 1 pairs from other hospitals.
By requiring only a maximal allocation (rather than an efficient one), one can also obtain
individual rationality:
Proposition 3.2. For every k ≥ 2, and every compatibility graph there exists a k-maximal
allocation that is individually rational.
The proof of Lemma 3.2 is by construction using the following simple augmenting algo-
rithm which is based on the augmenting matching algorithm of Edmonds (1965); Such an
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algorithm begins by finding a k-efficient allocation in Vh for every hospital h, and then it
repeatedly searches for an allocation that only increases the total number of matched pairs
without unmatching any pair that was previously matched (although possibly rematching
such pairs using different edges), until such an allocation cannot be found.
As noted above, for the case k = 2 every 2-maximal allocation is also 2-efficient. Therefore
by applying the augmenting algorithm:
Proposition 3.3. There exists an individually rational allocation with exchanges of size at
most 2 that is also 2-efficient in every compatibility graph.
So Theorem 3.1 shows that for k>2 there is a very high potential cost of individual
rationality, but it gives a worst-case result. However, it appears that the expected efficiency
loss from requiring individual rationality can be very small. Indeed our simulations show
that if all incompatible pairs are in the same exchange pool, the average number
of patients who do not get a kidney due to requiring IR is less than 1 (see Table
1). But as we shall see in Section 8 the cost of failing to guarantee individual rationality
could be large if that causes hospitals to match their own internal pairs.
No. of hospitals 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22
IR,k=3 6.8 18.37 35.42 49.3 63.68 81.43 97.82 109.01 121.81 144.09 160.74
Efficient,k=3 6.89 18.67 35.97 49.75 64.34 81.83 98.07 109.41 122.1 144.35 161.07
Table 1: Number of transplants achieved using maximum size individually rational alloca-
tions vs. using efficient (and not necessarily individually rational) allocations.
In the next sections we will prove that the efficiency loss from choosing an IR allocation
of maximum size is small in large compatibility graphs, supporting the simulations results.
4 Random Exchange Pools
To discuss the Bayesian setting it is useful to consider random compatibility graphs. Each
person in the population has one of 4 blood types A,B, AB. and O, according to whether her
blood contains the proteins A, B, both A and B, or neither. The probability that a random
person’s blood type is X is given by µX > 0. We will assume that µO > µA > µB > µAB (as
in the U.S. population).13 For any two blood types X and Y, we write Y B X if a donor of
13In practice µO = 0.48, µA = 0.34, µB = 0.14 and µAB = 0.04.
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blood type Y and a patient with blood type X are blood type compatible, which occurs if X
includes whatever blood proteins A and B are contained in Y.14
A patient-donor pair has pair type (or just type, whenever it is clear from the context)
X-Y if the patient has blood type X and the donor has blood type Y. The set of pair types
will be denoted by P . In order for a donor and a patient to be compatible they need to be
both blood type compatible and tissue-type compatible. To test tissue type compatibility
a crossmatch test is performed. Each patient has a level of percentage reactive antibodies
(PRA) which determines the likelihood that the patient will be compatible with a random
donor. The lower the PRA of a patient, the more likely the patient is compatible with a
random donor. In this paper we simplify the PRA characteristics and assume there exist
two levels of PRA, L and H(L < H); the probability that a patient p with PRA L (H) and
a donor are tissue type incompatible is given by γL (γH). Furthermore the probability that
a random patient has PRA L is given by υ > 0. Let γ¯ denote the expected PRA level of a
random patient, that is γ¯ = υγL + (1− υ)γH .
Definition 4.1 (Random Compatibility Graph). A random (directed) compatibility
graph of size m, denoted D(m), consists of m incompatible patient-donor pairs, and a
random edge is generated between every donor and each patient compatible with that donor.
Hence, such a graph is generated in two phases:
1. Each node/incompatible pair in the graph is randomized as follows. A patient p and
a potential donor d are created with blood types drawn independently according to the
probability distribution µ = (µX)X∈{A,B,AB,O}. The PRA of patient p, denoted by γ(p),
is also randomized (L with probability υ and H with probability 1− υ).
A number z is drawn uniformly from [0, 1] and (p, d) forms a new node if and only if
p and d are blood type incompatible or p and d are blood type compatible but z ≤ γ(p)
(so p and d are tissue type incompatible).
2. For any two pairs v1 = (p1, d1) and v2 = (p2, d2), there is an edge from v1 to v2 if and
only if d1 and p2 are ABO compatible and also tissue type compatible (d1 is tissue type
compatible with p2 with probability 1− γ(p2)).
14Thus type O patients can receive kidneys only from type O donors, while type O donors can give kidneys
to patients of any blood type. Note that since only incompatible pairs are present in the kidney exchange
pool, donors of blood type O will be underrepresented, since most such donors will be compatible with their
intended recipients; the only incompatible pairs with an O donor will be tissue-type incompatible. (Roth
et al. (2005a) showed that a significant increase in the number of kidney exchanges could be achieved by
allowing compatible pairs to participate, but this has not become common practice.)
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We will often denote a random compatibility graph by D(Hn), thus D(Hn) = D(m)
where m is the total number of pairs in all hospitals belonging to Hn.
The posterior probability that an incompatible pair (p, d) is of type X-Y will be denoted
by µX-Y. Define
1
ρ
to be the probability that a random pair (p, d) is incompatible. Thus
if X and Y are two blood types such that Y B X then µX-Y = ρµXµYγ¯ and otherwise
µX-Y = ρµXµY.
We are going to model kidney exchange with many patient-donor pairs (in many hospi-
tals) as a large random compatibility graph and use results and methods from random graph
theory.
4.1 Random graphs - background
We briefly describe here some results that will provide intuition and be building blocks in
our proofs. A random graph G(m, p) is a graph with m nodes and between each two different
nodes an undirected edge exists with probability p (p is a non-increasing function of m). A
bipartite random graph G(m,m, p) consists of two disjoint sets of nodes V and W , each
of size m, and an undirected edge between any two nodes v ∈ V and w ∈ W exists with
probability p (no two nodes within the same set V or W have an edge between them). It
will be useful to think of an undirected edge as two directed edges, one in each direction.
Throughout the paper by saying just a “random graph” we will not refer to a specific
type, but a graph that is generated by any of the graph generating processes defined in this
paper (e.g., D(m), G(m, p), and G(m,m, p)).
For any graph theoretic property Q there is a probability that a random graph G satisfies
Q, denoted by Pr (G |= Q). The property Q is monotone if this probability is monotone in
p.
A matching in an undirected graph is a set of edges for which no two edges have a
node in common. A matching is nearly perfect if it matches (contains) all but at most
one nodes in the graph, and perfect if it matches all nodes. Note that the existence of a
(nearly) perfect matching in an undirected graph is a monotone property.
Erdos and Renyi provided a threshold function r(m) = lnm
m
for the existence of a perfect
matching in G(m, p(m)). We state here a corollary of their result.
Erdos-Renyi Theorem: Let Q be the property that there exists a nearly perfect matching.
For any constant p
1. Pr (G(m, p) |= Q) = 1− o(1).1516
15For any two functions f and g we write f = o(g) if the limit of the ratio f(n)g(n) tends to zero when n tends
to infinity.
16 The Erdos-Renyi theorem showed stronger results, which asserts that r(m) = lnmm is a threshold function
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2. Pr (G(m,m, p) |= Q) = 1− o(1).
Remark on the convergence rate: The probability of a perfect matching in G(m, p)
and G(m,m, p) converges to 1 at an exponential rate for any constant p. More precisely, as
shown in Janson et al. (2000),
Pr (G(m,m, p) |= Q) = 1−O(me−mp) = 1− o(2−mp),
and clearly a perfect matching in G(m, p) exists with at least the same convergence rate.
We will often just write 1− o(1) in our results and proofs, however the reader should bear in
mind that each time we write 1− o(1) it can be replaced by an exponential rate, so we are
dealing with fairly rapid convergence, and we will see this in the accompanying simulations.
For simplicity we adopt the following formalism from random graph theory: if the prob-
ability that a given property Q is satisfied in a random graph G tends to 1 when m tends to
∞, we say that Q holds in almost every (large) G.
In the next section we study efficiency in large random compatibility graphs. We let γL
and γH (the probability of tissue type incompatibility for patients with low or high PRA) be
non-decreasing functions of m, with the important special case in which both are constants.
5 Efficient Allocations in Large Random Compatibility
Graphs
The relative number of pairs of various types will be useful in studying efficient allocations.
Lemma 5.1. In almost every large D(m):
1. For all X∈ {A,B,AB} the number of O-X pairs is larger than the number of X-O pairs.
2. For all X ∈ {A,B} the number of X-AB pairs is larger than the number of AB-X pairs.
3. The absolute difference between the number of A-B pairs and B-A pairs is o(m). Con-
sequently this difference is smaller than the number of pairs of any other pair type.17
for the existence of a perfect matching; that is, if p = p(m) is such that r(m) = o(p(m)) then the probability
a nearly perfect matching exists converges to 1, and if p(m) = o(r(m)), the probability a nearly perfect
matching exists converges to 0.
17Terasaki et al. (1998) claim that the frequency of A-B pairs (0.05) is larger than B-A pairs (0.03) but
they do not give any data or other explanation to support their claim. Our result just asserts that the
absolute difference is “small”.
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Lemma 5.1 whose proof appears in the appendix, motivates the following partition of
patient-donor pair types P (see also Roth et al. (2007b) and U¨nver (2010)): Let
PO = {X-Y ∈ P : Y B X and X 6= Y}
be the set of overdemanded types.
Let
PU = {X-Y ∈ P : X B Y and X 6= Y}
be the set of underdemanded types.
Let
PS = {X-X ∈ P}
be the set of selfdemanded types, and finally let PR be the set of reciprocally demanded
types which consists of types A-B and B-A.
Intuitively, an over-demanded pair is offering a kidney in greater demand than the one
they are seeking. For example a patient whose blood type is A and a donor whose blood type
is O form an overdemanded pair. Underdemanded types have the reverse property: they are
seeking a kidney that is in greater demand than the one they are offering in exchange. A
donor and patient in a pair with a selfdemanded type have the same blood type.
We will make the following assumptions which are compatible with blood type frequencies
and with observed tissue-type sensitivity frequencies. Zenios et al. (2001) reported that for
non-related blood type donors and recipients γ¯ = 0.11.18
Assumption A [Non-highly-sensitized patients] γ¯ < 1
2
.19
Assumption B [Blood type frequencies] µO < 1.5µA.
20
Proposition 5.2. Almost every large D(m) has an efficient allocation that requires ex-
changes of no more than size 3 with the following properties:
1. Every selfdemanded pair X-X is matched in a 2-way or a 3-way exchange with other
selfdemanded pairs (no more than one 3-way exchange is needed, in the case of an odd
number of X-X pairs).
18One can extend our results to a larger tissue-type incompatibility probability, but the most highly
sensitized patients are a topic for another day, since the large graph approximations we use here do not
adequately model the situation facing a very highly sensitized patient in a finite market.
19This assumption is also used for avoiding case-by-case analysis; one can provide similar results for the
opposite inequality. However the limit results we obtain here for large compatibility graphs are less of a
good approximation to the situation facing very high PRA patients in the finite graphs we see in practical
applications than they are for the situation facing the large majority of patients who are not extremely highly
sensitized. We will return to this, and the open questions it raises, in the conclusion.
20We will use this assumption to construct the efficient allocation. However even if this assumption does
not hold, using a similar method of proof one can construct a very similar allocation. The details of the
efficient allocation would slightly change, but not our results about individually rational allocations.
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2. Either every B-A pair is matched in a 2-way exchange with an A-B pair or every A-B
pair is matched in a two way exchange with a B-A pair.
3. Let X,Y ∈ {A,B} and X 6= Y. If there are more Y-X than X-Y then every Y-X pair
that is not matched to an X-Y pair is matched in a 3-way exchange with an O-Y pair
and an X-O pair.
4. Every AB-O pair is matched in a 3-way exchange with an O-A pair and an A-AB pair.
5. Every overdemanded pair X-O (X 6= O) that is not matched as above is matched to an
O-X pair.
The proof of Proposition 5.2 is deferred to the Appendix. Roth Sonmez and Unver (2007)
show a similar result to Proposition 5.2 and a similar result can also be derived from Un-
ver (2009). Both these papers however assumed that there are no tissue type incompatibilities
between patients and other patients’ donors in order to approximate a large market. Our
result provides a mathematical foundation to essentially justify their assumption. In addi-
tion, both papers show that exchanges of size at most k = 4 are needed to find an efficient
allocation (Unver (2009) also analyzes a dynamic world). The difference from our result (we
need at most 3-way exchanges) follows from the fact that they assumed that there are more
A-B pairs than B-A pairs (Unver assumes that the probability for a pair to be of type A-B is
greater than the probability that it will be of type B-A). In fact simulations by Roth Sonmez
and Unver (2007) find very few four way exchanges are needed. It is important to note that
although µA-B = µB-A the probability that the number of each of such pairs is different is
positive, the difference between the number of these pairs, as Lemma 5.1 implies, will almost
always be sufficiently small to make 4-way exchanges unnecessary.21 Independently of our
work, Toulis and Parkes (2010) study 2-way exchanges using random graphs, and provide a
very similar efficient allocation.
5.1 Sketch of proof for Proposition 5.2
We will use a simple extension of the Erdos-Renyi Theorem (Lemma 9.5 in the appendix)
to l-partite directed graphs (l ≥ 2) which asserts that if at most one of the l sets (parts of
the graph) does not grow to infinity then almost every such large graph consists of a perfect
allocation, that is an allocation which matches all the pairs in the smallest part of the graph.
21Our result would hold also in a model at which µA-B 6= µB-A but the difference between these two
probabilities is sufficiently small.
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We assume that the number of A-B pairs is at least the number of B-A pairs (for the
converse a symmetric argument holds). An application of the Erdos-Renyi Theorem estab-
lishes that all selfdemanded pairs can be matched using 2-way or 3-way exchanges to each
other with high probability. Similarly all B-A pairs can be matched to A-B pairs using 2-way
exchanges. We choose such a preliminary allocation arbitrarily, say M1.
Figure 3: The structure of an efficient allocation in the graph D(m) (excluding all selfde-
manded pairs). All B-A pairs are matched to A-B (assuming there are more B-A than A-B),
the remainder of the A-B pairs (VA-B) are matched in 3-way exchanges using O-A’s and
B-O’s. AB-O are matched in 3-ways each using two overdemanded pairs, and every other
overdemanded pair is matched to a corresponding underdemanded pair.
Let VA-B be the set of A-B pairs that are not matched so far by M1 (see Figure 3).
By Lemma 5.1 the cardinality of the set VA-B is smaller than both the size of the set of
B-O pairs and the size of the set of O-A pairs. Again by an extension of the Erdos-Renyi
theorem this graph almost always contains a perfect allocation, implying that all A-B pairs
can be matched (i.e. those not matched to B-A pairs are matched in 3-way exchanges of the
form A-B,B-O,O-A). Similarly one can match with high probability all AB-O pairs using
3-way exchanges each containing A-AB pairs and O-A pairs.22 Using our assumptions on γ¯
one can show that there are many more O-B pairs and O-A pairs than B-O and A-O pairs
respectively that are yet to be matched. Therefore all remaining overdemanded pairs can
be matched to underdemanded pairs (again by considering the bipartite graphs induced by
those pairs).
Finally the efficiency of our construction roughly follows by observing that (i) all pairs
22Here is where we use Assumption B. If assumption B would not hold, then the construction allocation
slightly changes by having some AB-O pairs matched in 3-way exchanges using O-B and B-AB pairs, and if
necessary also some AB-O pairs matched in 2-way exchanges using O-AB pairs.
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but underdemanded are matched, and that (ii) no overdemanded pair can help more than
2 underdemanded pairs to get a transplant, and AB-O is the only pair type that can help
2 underdemanded pairs to get a transplant. Therefore, more than 3-way exchanges are not
needed to obtain efficiency.
5.2 Remarks on efficient allocations
By construction every pair whose type is colored in Figure 3 (as well as all selfdemanded
pairs) is matched, implying that we obtained a 3-efficient allocation. Roth et al. (2007b)
considered 4-way exchanges with pairs AB-O,O-A,A-B and B-AB to obtain efficiency (see
Figure 4). However, such an exchange uses an AB-O pair and an A-B pair that is not
matched to a B-A pair. But pairs of both these types can all be matched in 3-way exchanges
as in Figure 4, implying that using such a 4-way will result in fewer transplants. (That is,
the 4-way exchange is made at the expense of two 3-way exchanges, see Figure 4.)
Figure 4: The possible 4-way exchange uses the bottlenecks of the 3-way exchanges - AB-O
pairs and A-B pairs.
From Proposition 5.2 and its proof one can derive the efficiency loss between different k’s
in large graphs.
Corollary 5.3. Let Wk(m) be the size of a k-efficient allocation in D(m).
1. For every k ≥ 2, limm→∞ Pr (W3(m) ≥ Wk(m)) = 1.
2. For every  > 0, limm→∞ Pr
(
W3(m)−W2(m) ≤ (1 + )(µAB−O)m+ µA−Bm
)
= 1.
3. In almost every large D(m), in all efficient allocations all pairs whose type is not
underdemanded are matched.
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The second part of Corollary 5.3 follows by constructing a 2-way efficient allocation in a
similar way as in Proposition 5.2.23
One possibly undesirable feature of the efficient allocation is that underdemanded pairs
of type O-AB will all be left unmatched. While it is inevitable that many underdemanded
pairs will be left unmatched, there is sometimes discomfort in medical settings having a priori
identifiable pairs seemingly singled out. A natural outcome would be that hospitals would
seek to match such pairs internally, a point to which we will return later, when we observe
that precisely these internal matches account for most of the efficiency cost of individual
rationality.
Until this point nothing has been said about individual rationality in the Bayesian setting.
In the next section we study the efficiency cost of requiring an allocation to be individually
rational in large exchange pools.
6 Individual Rationality is Not Very Costly in Large
Random Compatibility Graphs
In Section 3 we saw that individually rational allocations can harm efficiency, and provided
worst case tight bounds. In this section we derive a very much smaller upper bound on this
loss for large random compatibility graphs.
One way to bound the efficiency loss is by attempting to construct an efficient allocation
as in Proposition 5.2, while making sure that the pairs each hospital can internally match
are part of the efficient allocation. Unfortunately such an allocation is not always feasible.
Consider for example the following two unbalanced 3-way exchanges (B-O,O-A,A-B) and
(A-O,O-B,B-A). Too many 3-way internal exchanges of the second type, for example, as well
as other internal exchanges that include O-B pairs but not B-O pairs (see e.g. Figure 5),
could possibly lead to a situation in which, to fulfill individual rationality requirements set
by internal exchanges, more O-B pairs would potentially need to be matched than the total
number of B-O pairs. This can harm efficiency since as Theorem 5.2 suggests more trans-
plants are obtained by choosing the two 2-way exchanges rather than the 3-way exchange in
Figure 5.
Individual rationality, however, does not require the clearinghouse to match a specific
maximum set of pairs that each hospital can internally match, but only to guarantee to
match at least the number of pairs each hospital can internally match. For example if a
hospital has an internal unbalanced exchange A-O,O-B,B-A and an internally unmatched
23In particular AB-O pairs will be matched to O-AB pairs using 2-way allocations rather than being
matched in a 3-way as described in Proposition 5.2.
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O-A pair, then to satisfy individual rationality it is sufficient to match the A-O,B-A and
O-A pairs.
Figure 5: A 3-way (internal) exchange that matches an O-B pair for which there may not
be a corresponding B-O pair.
As the above discussion suggests, individually rational allocations may contain (many)
more underdemanded pairs of a specific type than its reciprocally overdemanded type. How-
ever if hospitals are not “too big” this is not likely to happen, since unbalanced three way
exchanges are unlikely to occur among a small number of patient donor pairs. We say that
a hospital of size c is regular if by randomly choosing an internal allocation that maximizes
the number of underdemanded pairs, for any underdemanded type X-Y the expected number
of matched X-Y pairs is less than the expected number of overdemanded Y-X pairs in its
pool.
We formalize this. For any type t ∈ P and set of pairs S we denote by τ(S, t) the set
of pairs with type t in S and for a set of types T ⊆ P let τ(S, T ) = ∪t∈T τ(S, t) and let
µT =
∑
t∈T µt. For any set of pairs V let M
V
PU be a (random) allocation in V that maximizes
the number of matched underdemanded pairs in V .
Definition 6.1. We say that c > 0 is a regular size if for every underdemanded type X-
Y∈ PU
EV [
∫
|τ(MVPU (V ),X-Y)|dF (V )|#V = c] < µY-Xc, (1)
where F (V ) is any distribution over all allocations that maximize the number of matched
underdemanded pairs in a given set of pairs V .
Using simulations with distributions from clinical data (see Ashlagi et al. (2010c)) we
find that hospitals of size up to at least c = 100 are regular. This allows us to state our first
main result.
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Theorem 6.2. Suppose every hospital size is regular and bounded by some c¯ > 0 and let
 > 0. In almost every large graph D(Hn) there exists an individually rational allocation
using exchanges of size at most 3, which is at most µAB-Om + µA-Bm smaller than the
efficient allocation, where m is the number of pairs in the graph.
As suggested in the theorem statement (and as we will show in the proof) most of the
efficiency loss comes from matching of (otherwise unmatched) underdemanded O-AB pairs,
in 2-way exchanges to AB-O pairs. This means that the efficiency loss is only about 1%,
which is the (simulated) frequency of the AB-O pairs. Note also that, as remarked earlier,
it is hard to regret this small decrease in the total number of matched pairs, since no O-AB
pairs would have been matched had the goal been to maximizes the number of transplants.24
Theorem 6.2 is a limit theorem, but Table 1 showed simulation results that demonstrate
that the cost of individual rationality is very low even for sizes of exchange pools observed
in present-day clinical settings.25
The allocation constructed in the proof of Theorem 6.2 can fail to be individually rational
with low probability, although it is always close to being efficient. However, by Theorem 6.2
and Proposition 3.2 one can also construct in every graph an allocation that is individually
rational such that in almost every graph it will be within the indicated efficiency bound 26
Corollary 6.3. Suppose every hospital size is regular and bounded by some c¯ > 0, and let
 > 0. The size of a maximum IR allocation is at most µAB-Om + µA-Bm smaller then the
size of an efficient allocation in almost every large graph D(Hn), where m is the number of
pairs in the graph.
6.1 Sketch of proof for Theorem 6.2
The main tool in proving the theorem is an individual rationality lemma that focuses only
on underdemanded pairs, and shows that with high probability there exists a satisfiable set
of underdemanded pairs which can be matched, where a satisfiable set is a set in which (i)
for each hospital, the set contains at least the number of underdemanded pairs the hospital
can internally match, and (ii) for each underdemanded type X-Y the number of pairs in the
set is the same number as the total number of overdemanded Y-X pairs in the entire pool.
24We conjecture that the requirement that every hospital size be regular can be relaxed (to a weaker
definition of regular) or eliminated entirely.
25Independently of our work, Toulis and Parkes (2010) show that if only 2-way exchanges are possible
(also internally) then, also using random graphs, there is no efficiency loss at all. Their result follows from
Theorems 5.2, 6.2 and their proofs.
26In this alternative consruction, one first finds a maximum allocation within each hospital, and then finds
a maximum allocation in the entire graph subject to matching all pairs that are matched in the first phase.
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We formalize this. For every h ∈ Hn let Vh be the set of pairs of hospital h. For a
hospital h ∈ Hn and a set of pairs S ⊆ VHn we denote by α(S, h) = Vh ∩ S the set of pairs
in S belonging to h. Note that τ(MVhPU (Vh),PU) is a maximum set of underdemanded pairs
h can internally match. We let UHn = τ(VHn ,PU) and OHn = τ(VHn ,PO) be the set of all
underdemanded and overdemanded pairs in Hn respectively.
Definition 6.4. A set of underdemanded pairs S ⊆ τ(VHn ,PU) is called a satisfiable set
if
1. |α(S, h)| ≥ |τ(MVhPU (Vh),PU)| for all h ∈ Hn.
2. |τ(S,X-Y)| = |τ(VHn ,Y-X)| for all X-Y∈ PU .
Note that the first part can be thought of as individual rationality with respect to un-
derdemanded pairs.27
Lemma 6.5 (underdemanded rationality lemma). Suppose every hospital size is regular and
bounded by some c¯ > 0. With probability 1− o(1), there exists a satisfiable set Sn in D(Hn)
and a perfect allocation in the bipartite subgraph induced by Sn and τ(VHn ,PO).
The existence of a satisfiable set follows almost directly from the definition of regularity
(choose for each hospital a maximum set of underdemanded pairs it can internally match to
satisfy condition 1 of a satisfiable set) and from the fact that there are more underdemanded
pairs of type X-Y than Y-X pairs (so one can add from each underdemanded type X-Y
enough pairs to satisfy condition 2 of a satisfiable set).
However we also need to show that a perfect allocation as described in Lemma 6.5 ex-
ists; the problem with the above naive construction is that it adds information about non-
existence of internal edges which we wish to avoid in order to be able to use properties
of large random graphs with independent edge probabilities. Thus to see that Lemma 6.5
holds, we will construct a satisfiable set Sn with some additional properties; We partition
the hospitals into two sets H1n and H
2
n each with
n
2
hospitals, and find a satisfiable set Sn
such that (i) the number of underdemanded pairs of each type X-Y in Sn belonging to H
1
n
(H2n) equals the number of overdemanded pairs Y-X belonging to H
2
n (H
1
n). Then, using
Erdos-Renyi type of results, we show that one can match all overdemanded pairs of type
Y-X belonging to H1n (H
2
n) to X-Y underdemanded pairs in Sn belonging to H
2
n (H
1
n).
We continue with the proof sketch of Theorem 6.2. In the efficient allocation in a random
compatibility graph the only pairs that are not matched have underdemanded types. First
27Even if a hospital can internally match more pairs using fewer underdemanded pairs, it is reasonable to
consider this condition since pairs of other types will be “easy” to match as suggested by Proposition 5.2.
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we find an allocation as described in Lemma 6.5, in particular an allocation that matches
each overdemanded pair to an underdemanded pairs using 2-way exchanges. Furthermore
the selfdemanded pairs can be perfectly matched (using only other selfdemanded pairs) using
2-way or 3-way exchanges.
Finally since with a positive probability every hospital cannot match all its A-B pairs
and all its B-A pairs, there will be a linear number of A-B and B-A pairs that cannot be
internally matched. Therefore one can find a perfect allocation in the graph induced by these
pairs that matches all the the A-B and B-A pairs that the hospitals can internally match.
The efficient allocation would have, in addition, three way matches with AB-O pairs and
with the excess A-B or B-A pairs.
7 Kidney Exchange Mechanisms
We have seen that a mechanism that is individually rational for hospitals need not be costly
in terms of lost transplants, and individual rationality can be seen as a necessary condition
for full participation in a world in which a hospital can withdraw participation after see-
ing the allocation proposed by the centralized mechanism. But a mechanism that makes
it individually rational for hospitals to participate may still not be sufficient to elicit full
participation if it does not also make it a dominant strategy, or a Bayesian equilibrium, for
hospitals to reveal all their patient-donor pairs. We next begin the exploration of the in-
centive properties of exchange mechanisms, starting (as in the case of individual rationality)
with some negative worst-case results.
A kidney exchange mechanism, ϕ, maps a profile of incompatible pairs V = (V1, V2, . . . , Vn)
to an allocation, denoted by ϕ((Vh)h∈Hn). A mechanism ϕ is IR if for every profile V , ϕ(V )
is IR. Efficient and maximal mechanisms are defined similarly.
Every kidney exchange mechanism ϕ induces a game of incomplete information Γ(ϕ) in
which the players are the hospitals. The type of each hospital h is its set of incompatible
pairs. The realized type will be denoted by Vh and at this point we assume no prior over the
set of types. At strategy σh hospital h reports a subset of its incompatible pairs σh(Vh). For
any strategy profile σ let σ(V ) = (σ1(V1), . . . , σn(Vn)) be the profile of subsets of pairs each
hospital submits under σ given V . Therefore, for any profile V = (V1, . . . , Vn), at strategy
profile σ mechanism ϕ chooses the allocation ϕ(σ(V )).
A kidney exchange mechanism does not necessarily match all pairs in VHn = ∪h∈HnVh,
either because it didn’t match all reported pairs or because hospitals did not report all pairs.
Therefore we assume that each hospital also chooses an allocation in the set of its pairs that
are not matched by the mechanism. Formally, let ϕ be a kidney exchange mechanism and
let σ be a strategy profile and Vh be the type of each hospital. After the mechanism chooses
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ϕ(σ(V )), h finds an allocation in Vh \ϕ(σ(V ))(Vh), where ϕ(σ(V ))(Vh) is the set of all pairs
in Vh that are matched by the allocation ϕ(σ(V )). In particular every hospital h ∈ Hn has
an allocation function ϕh that maps any set of pairs Xh to an allocation ϕh(Xh).
Since each hospital wishes to maximizes the number of its own matched pairs, the utility
of hospital h, uh, at profile V and strategy profile σ, is defined by the number of pairs in Vh
who are matched by the centralized match, plus the number of its remaining pairs that h
can match using internal exchanges:
uh(σh(Vh), σ−h(V−h)) = |ϕ(σ(V ))(Vh)|+ |ϕh(Vh \ ϕ(σ(V ))(Vh))(Vh)|. (2)
In the next section we study incentives of hospitals in the games induced by kidney
exchange mechanisms.
8 Incentives
Loosely speaking, most of the kidney exchange mechanisms presently employed choose an
efficient allocation in the (reported) exchange pool.28 As already emphasized, maximizing the
number (or the weighted number) of transplants in the pool of patient-donor pairs reported
by hospitals is not the same as maximizing the number of transplants in the whole pool,
unless the whole pool is reported. We next consider the tensions between achieving efficiency,
and making reporting of the whole pool a dominant strategy for each hospital.
8.1 Strategyproofness–negative results for compatibility graphs
Section 3 showed that for any largest feasible exchange size k > 2, no individually rational
mechanism can be efficient, and obtained discouraging worst case bounds (although efficiency
can be achieved for k = 2). Here we show that for k ≥ 2, no mechanism that always produces
a k-maximal allocation (even if not efficient) can be individually rational and strategyproof,
again with discouraging worst case bounds.
A mechanism ϕ is strategyproof if it makes it a dominant strategy for every hospital to
report all of its incompatible pairs in the game Γ(ϕ); Formally, ϕ is strategyproof if for
every hospital h, every Vh, every strategy σ
′
h, and every V−h
uh(ϕ(Vh, V−h)) ≥ uh(ϕ(σ′h(Vh), V−h)). (3)
In an unpublished note Roth et al. (2007a) showed that (even for a maximum exchange
size k = 2):
28The mechanisms often maximize a weighted sum of transplants rather than a simple sum, to implement
priorities, such as for children and for how difficult it is to match a patient (due to high PRA levels).
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Proposition 8.1 (Roth et al. (2007a)). No IR mechanism is both maximal and strategyproof.
Proof. Consider a setting with two hospitals H2 = {a, b} such that Va = {a1, a2, a3, a4} and
Vb = {b1, b2, b3}. Further assume the compatibility graph induced by VH2 is given in Figure
6.
Figure 6
Note that every maximal allocation leaves exactly one node unmatched. Suppose ϕ is
both maximal and IR. We show that if a and b submit Va and Vb respectively, at least one
hospital strictly benefits from withholding a subset of its nodes. Let v ∈ VH2 be unmatched
in ϕ(Va, Vb). If v ∈ Va then ua(ϕ(Va, Vb)) = 3. However, by withholding a1 and a2, a’s utility
is 4 since the maximal allocation in V \ {a1, a2} matches both a3 and a4, and a can match
both a1 and a2 via an internal exchange. If v ∈ Vb then by a symmetric argument hospital
b would benefit by withholding b2 and b3.
Strategyproof mechanisms do exist, e.g. a mechanism that chooses allocations that max-
imize the number of matched nodes using only internal exchanges. Unfortunately, no such
mechanism is close to efficient (again, even for exchange size k=2):
Proposition 8.2. For k ≥ 2, no IR strategyproof mechanism can always guarantee more
than 1
2
of the efficient allocation.
Proof. Consider the same setting as in the proof of Proposition 8.1 (see Figure 6) and
suppose ϕ is an IR strategyproof mechanism which always guarantees more than 1/2 of
the efficient allocation. Note that either ua(ϕ(Va, Vb)) ≤ 3 or ub(ϕ(Va, Vb)) ≤ 2. Suppose
ua(ϕ(Va, Vb)) ≤ 3. As in the proof of Proposition 8.1, in order for it not to be beneficial
for a to withhold a1 and a2, the mechanism cannot match all pairs in {a3, a4} ∪ Vb. Thus
ϕ can choose at most a single exchange of size 2 in {a3, a4} ∪ Vb, which is only half of the
maximum (efficient) number, and not more, as required by assumption. The case in which
ub(ϕ(Va, Vb)) ≤ 2 is similar.
By allowing randomization between allocations (in particular allowing inefficient allo-
cations to be chosen with positive probability) one can hope to improve efficiency in ex-
pectation. Strategyproofness in this case means that, for any reports of other hospitals,
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no hospital h is better off in expectation reporting anything other than its type Vh. How-
ever, even random mechanisms do not reconcile individual rationality, strategyproofness and
efficiency:
Proposition 8.3. For k ≥ 2, no IR strategyproof (in expectation) randomized mechanism
can always guarantee more than 7
8
of the efficient allocation.
Proof. Consider the same setting as in the proof of Proposition 8.1 (see Figure 6) and
assume there exists a randomized IR strategyproof mechanism ϕ that guarantees more than
7/8 of the efficient allocation in every possible V . Any allocation leaves at least one node
unmatched. Therefore either E[ua(ϕ(Va, Vb))] ≤ 3.5 or E[ub(ϕ(Va, Vb))] ≤ 2.5. Suppose
E[ua(ϕ(Va, Vb))] ≤ 3.5. We argue that under the mechanism ϕ, hospital a benefits from
withholding a1 and a2. Since ϕ guarantees more than 7/8 of the efficient allocation in
{a3, a4, b1, b2, b3}, ϕ will choose the allocation containing exchanges a3, b2 and b3, a4 with
probability more than 3/4. Therefore a’s expected utility from reserving 2 transplants to do
internally will be 2+c for some c > 1.5. A similar argument holds if E[ub(ϕ(Va, Vb))] ≤ 2.5
Ashlagi et al. (2010b) study dominant strategy mechanisms for k = 2 and provide a
strategyproof (in expectation) randomized mechanism which guarantees 0.5 of the 2-efficient
allocation.29 But it remains an open question whether the bounds established in this section
can be achieved.
Strategyproofness is independent of any probability distribution of the underlying com-
patibility graphs. However, in the case of compatibility of kidneys, we know a lot about the
(approximate) distribution of compatibility graphs that might be useful for finding mech-
anisms that can achieve (almost) efficient allocations as Bayesian equilibria.30 We proceed
by studying the Bayesian setting in a large random kidney exchange program, in the spirit
of recent advances in the study of two sided matching in large markets (cf. Immorlica
and Mahdian (2005) , Kojima and Pathak (2009), Kojima et al. (2010), and Ashlagi et al.
(2010a)).
29The model in Ashlagi et al. (2010b) does not allow hospitals to choose an internal allocation after
the mechanism has chosen an allocation. However their algorithm works in our model. Specifically their
mechanism randomly partitions hospitals into two sets and chooses randomly an allocation with maximum
number of matched nodes among allocations that satisfy (i) there are no edges between the nodes of two
hospitals within each set, and (ii) are 2-efficient within each hospital.
30An efficiency approximation gap between the Bayesian approach and prior free approach has been shown
for example by Babaioff et al. (2010) in an online supply problem.
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8.2 The Bayesian setting
To study hospitals’ incentives in a given mechanism we consider a Bayesian game in which
hospitals strategically report a subset of their set of incompatible pairs, and the mechanism
chooses an allocation. Thus a kidney exchange game is now a Bayesian game Γ(ϕ) =
(H, (Th)h∈H , (uh)h∈H) where H is the set of hospitals, uh is the utility function for hospital
h, and Th is the set of possible private types for each hospital, drawn independently from a
known distribution. The type for each hospital is the subgraph induced by its pairs in the
random compatibility graph, i.e. after the graph is generated, each hospital observes its own
subgraph.
The expected utility for hospital h at strategy profile σ given Vh is
EV−h [uh(ϕ(σh(Vh), σ−h(V−h))]. (4)
Let σ be a strategy profile and let  > 0. Strategy σh is an -best response against σ−h if for
every σ′h and every Vh
EV−h [u(ϕ(σh(Vh), σ−h(V−h))] ≥ EV−h [u(ϕ(σ′h(Vh), σ−h(V−h))]− . (5)
σ is an -Bayes Nash equilibrium if for every hospital h, σh is an  best response against σ−h.
For  = 0, σ is the standard Bayes Nash equilibrium.
A particular strategy which will interest us is the truth-telling strategy: a hospital
always reports its entire set of incompatible pairs. To analyze mechanisms for large ran-
dom exchange pools, it will be useful to consider a sequence of random kidney exchange
games (Γ1(ϕ),Γ2(ϕ), . . .), where Γn(ϕ) = (Hn, (Th)h∈Hn , (uh)h∈Hn) denotes a random kidney
exchange game with |Hn| = n hospitals.
8.2.1 The status quo
A stylized version of current kidney exchange mechanisms is the following:
Maximum Transplants mechanism (MT): for any set of incompatible pairs V choose
uniformly at random an efficient allocation in V .
In Section 1.1. we observed that mechanisms that choose weighted maximum allocations
can violate individually rationality. Here we observe that withholding pairs in the MT
mechanism can provide a non-negligible benefit to a hospital even in a large random graph.
Proposition 8.4. In the sequence of games Γ1(MT ),Γ2(MT ), . . . ,Γn(MT ), . . . ... there exist
no (n) = o(1) such that reporting truthfully is an (n)-Bayes Nash equilibrium in Γn(MT ).
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Proof. Suppose that all hospitals truthfully report all their pairs. It is sufficient to provide an
example of a compatibility graph for some hospital a, such that a is better off not reporting
truthfully. Let a be an arbitrary hospital and let Va = {a1, a2} where a1 and a2 are an O-B
pair and a B-O pair respectively and a1, a2 is an internal exchange. For sufficiently large n,
by Proposition 5.2 in any efficient allocation the set of reported pairs by all hospitals satisfies
the following: in almost every efficient allocation in D(Hn) a constant fraction of the O-B
pairs will not be matched. Therefore since by definition of MT the O-B pairs that are not
matched are chosen randomly, the probability that any O-B pair will not be matched is at
least some constant probability q > 0 (not depending on n). Therefore if hospital a reports
both pairs a1 and a2, the expected utility for a is 2 − q and by not reporting both pairs h
obtains a utility of 2.
Essentially the existence of any reciprocally overdemanded and underdemanded types in
the system drives Proposition 8.4.31
We simulated the MT mechanism and examined two types of behavior for hospitals: truth-
telling, in which a hospital reports all of its incompatible pairs to the mechanism, and a naive
strategy called withhold internal matches, in which a hospital withholds a maximum set of
pairs it can match internally. As depicted in Figure 7, withholding provides more transplants
on average than truth-telling for an arbitrary hospital given that all other hospitals are
truth-telling. The benefit from withholding becomes even higher when all other hospitals
also withhold internal matches (see Figure 7).
Following these findings we compared the efficiency achieved when hospitals use the
withhold internal matches strategy, to the efficiency achieved when hospitals report truthfully
to the MT (non IR) mechanism. The efficiency loss is about 10% in both k = 3 and k = 2
(see Table 2).
8.2.2 Individual rationality is not sufficient
Following the results of the previous sections an important open question is how to design a
kidney exchange mechanism that minimizes the efficiency loss in equilibrium.
For any set of pair types TPU let MVT be the set of allocations in V that match the
maximum number of pairs in V whose type belong to T . Following Theorem 6.2 one natural
candidate for a mechanism is to randomly choose a maximum IR allocation.
31The MT mechanism might further deepen this issue: consider hospitals that withhold internal unbalanced
3-way exchanges. Since the expected number of each of the two unbalanced exchanges is different, either
more A-B or more B-A pairs will be withheld by hospitals. If this difference is “large”, one of these pair types
in fact will play the role of a new overdemanded type. For efficiency, one wishes to overcome imbalances
rather than create new ones.
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Figure 7: Withholding internal matches vs. reporting truthfully in MT mechanism (k=3).
k=2 k=3
No. of hospitals No. of Pairs Withholding Strategy IR Withholding Strategy IR Efficient
12 131 55.84 60.6 70.15 81.43 81.83
14 154 68.64 74.72 85.44 97.82 98.07
16 173 77.44 84.2 96.57 109.01 109.41
18 191 87.84 95.62 109.76 121.81 122.1
20 227 107.74 116.68 132.32 144.09 144.35
Table 2: Number of transplants achieved under two different strategies: (i) each hospital
withholds an efficient internal allocation and (ii) each hospital reports reports truthfully.
RandomIR mechanism:
Input: a profile of incompatible pairs (B1, B2, . . . , Bn).
Step 1: randomly choose a maximum allocation Mh ∈MBhP for every hospital h ∈ Hn.
Step 2: choose a maximum allocation in BHn = ∪h∈HnBh that matches all pairs in ∪h∈HnMh(Bh).
The RandomIR mechanism is by construction individually rational, and by a similar result
to Corollary 6.3 the efficiency loss is small.
However, RandomIR will quickly run into incentive problems for the same reason as the
MT mechanism: Consider a hospital a which has the compatibility graph on the left side
of Figure 8, i.e. the efficient internal allocation for a uses the 3-way allocation A-O,A-A,A-
A. By similar arguments as in the proof of Proposition 8.4 hospital a will be better off
withholding the A-O,O-A internal match, since its O-A pair is not as likely to be matched
by the central exchange as are both A-A pairs.
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Figure 8: On the left side, hospital a has a unique efficient allocation of size 3, but can also
internally match the A-O and O-A pairs. On the right side hospital a has one overdemanded
A-O pair and two O-A pairs and it can internally match either one.
As underdemanded pairs are the ones that compete for being matched, a natural attempt
to solve this problem is to change Step 1 in the RandomIR mechanism so that for each
hospital h it will choose from MPUBh rather than from MBhP :
(New) Step 1: randomly choose a maximum allocation Mh ∈ MPUBh for every hospital
h ∈ Hn.
Unfortunately truth-telling is still not a Bayes-Nash equilibrium in the game induced by
the (new) RandomIR mechanism. To see this suppose all hospitals but a report truthfully
and suppose a has the compatibility graph on the right side of Figure 8. We argue that
hospital a is better off not revealing the overdemanded pair a1. If hospital a withholds a1
there is some probability p that each of a2 and a3 will be matched. Therefore if both pairs
a2 and a3 are matched or if neither is matched by the mechanism, hospital a will end up
with two pairs matched. If, however, exactly one of these pairs, say a2, is matched by the
mechanism, a will end with 3 matches since it can still match a1 to a3. Hence, a’s utility is
2p2 + 2(1− p)2 + 3 ∗ 2(1− p)p. (6)
By reporting truthfully, the mechanism guarantees to match a1 and one of a2 or a3, while
the remaining pair will be matched with probability p + o(1) (since the market is large the
probability remains “very close” to p). Therefore a’s expected utility is 2 + p + o(1). A
simple calculation shows that for any 0 < p < 1
2
, a is better off withholding a1. (Loosely
speaking since γ¯ < 1
2
, there are at least twice as many O-A pairs as A-O pairs, implying
that the probability that any particular O-A pair that is not guaranteed to be matched will
be chosen to be matched by the mechanism is likely to be p < 1
2
.)
Notice that in this case hospital a has an incentive to withhold a single overdemanded
pair rather than an internal exchange. To prevent hospitals from wishing to withhold overde-
manded pairs as in this example, a mechanism will likely have to give priority to underde-
manded pairs from hospitals that contribute overdemanded pairs. We discuss this next.
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8.2.3 Towards a new mechanism
So far we have seen natural mechanisms that are either manipulable by withholding an
internal exchange that contains an overdemanded pair or by withholding an overdemanded
pair by itself. Either way, the main obstacle in designing a Bayesian incentive compatible
mechanism is preventing hospitals from withholding their overdemanded pairs.
In this section we present a mechanism for kidney exchange which makes the truth-telling
strategy profile an approximate Bayes-Nash equilibrium, assuming that hospitals satisfy a
stronger regularity condition. This stronger regularity condition, which now deals with
each underdemanded type and its reciprocal overdemanded type separately, will allow us
to separate the reporting problem for each type of overdemanded pair. This will allow a
mechanism in which there is no incentive to withhold an overdemanded pair of some type
in order to influence the match probability of an underdemanded pair that is not of its
reciprocal type.
Recall thatMVT is the set of allocations in V that maximize the number of matched pairs
in V whose type belongs to T . If T = {t} is a singleton we will just write MVt .
Definition 8.5. We say that c > 0 is a strongly regular size if for every underdemanded
type X-Y∈ PU
EV [#τ(M
V
X-Y(V ),X-Y)|#V = c] < µY-Xc, (7)
where MVX-Y is an arbitrary allocation in MVX-Y.
Using simulations we find that hospitals of size up to at least c = 30 are strongly regular.
Throughout this section we assume that every hospital’s size is strongly regular and bounded.
The mechanism we introduce provides an allocation that uses only 2-way exchanges with
similar properties to the one constructed in the proof of Theorem 6.2: (i) overdemanded X-Y
pairs are matched in 2-way exchange to Y-X pairs, (ii) A-B and B-A pairs will be matched to
each other in 2-way exchanges, (iii) and selfdemanded pairs will be matched to each other.
The key to the mechanism lies in how property (i) is implemented, i.e. in how the mecha-
nism will choose for each underdemanded type which pairs will be matched. In particular we
will use a lottery, called the underdemanded lottery, to determine for each underdemanded
type X-Y∈ PU a set of X-Y pairs, denoted by Sh(X-Y), that will be matched for each hos-
pital h (ideally we want to match all overdemanded pairs, so the total number of X-Y pairs
that will be matched equals the total number of Y-X pairs in the pool).
We describe the underdemanded lottery for a given underdemanded type X-Y∈ PU . For
each h, Sh(X-Y) will be initialized to be a set of X-Y pairs with maximum cardinality that
h can match internally, and the lottery will output for each hospital a set of pairs that are
chosen to be matched.
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Underdemanded lottery
Input: a set of hospitals Hn, a profile of subsets of pairs (B1, . . . , Bn), an underdemanded
type X-Y, and an integer 0 < θ < |τ(BHn ,X-Y)| which is interpreted as the number of X-Y
pairs that we want to choose in total.32
Initialization: For each hospital h let Qh(X-Y) = |τ(Bh,X-Y)| and let Sh(X-Y) be an arbi-
trary maximum set of X-Y pairs h can internally match in Bh.
33
Main Step: Let J be a bucket containing Qh(X-Y) balls for each hospital h. As long as∑
h∈Hn |Sh(X-Y)| < θ:
1. Choose uniformly at random a ball from J without replacement. If the ball belongs to
hospital h, then add an arbitrary X-Y pair to Sh(X-Y) from Bh\Sh(X-Y) if such exists.
The important change from RandomIR is the Main Step in the underdemanded lottery;
consider the graph of hospital a in the right hand side of Figure 8. If a2 was chosen to
be matched in the (new) Step 1 of RandomIR, then in Step 2 only remaining pairs are
considered to be chosen from. In the underdemanded lottery, Sa(X-Y) is initialized to either
{a2} or {a3}, assume that Sa(X-Y) = {a2} without loss of generality. However, two balls
are initially placed in the bucket J for hospital a, and if either one of them is drawn, a3
is added to Sa(X-Y). That is, the fact that the hospital can internally match one of its
underdemanded pairs now increases the probability that another of its underdemanded pairs
of the same type will be matched.
We are now ready to state the mechanism. For ease of exposition we assume throughout
this section that n is even.
The Bonus Mechanism
Input: a set of hospitals Hn = {1, . . . , n} and a profile of incompatible pairs (B1, B2, . . . , Bn),
each of a strongly regular size.
Step 1 [Match selfdemanded pairs]: find a maximum allocation, MS in the graph induced by
all selfdemanded pairs BHn.
Step 2 [Match A-B and B-A pairs]: for each hospital h choose randomly an allocation Mh ∈
MPRBh.34 Find a maximum allocation,MR in the graph induced by A-B and B-A pairs
among those that maximize the number of matched pairs in ∪h∈Hnτ(Mh(Bh),PR).
Step 3 [Match overdemanded and underdemanded pairs]: Partition the set of hospitals into
two sets H1n = {1, . . . , n2} and H2n = {n2 + 1, . . . , n}. For each underdemanded type X-Y∈ PU
32The parameter θ is not set here to be the number of Y-X pairs in BHn since the mechanism will apply
the lottery twice, each time with a different set of n2 hospitals and θ will be the number of Y-X pairs in the
set of other n2 hospitals. This will be further discussed below.
33Formally Sh(X-Y) = τ(M
Bh
X-Y(Bh),X-Y) for some M
Bh
X-Y ∈MBhX-Y.
34Recall that PR = {A-B,B-A}.
30
and for each j = 1, 2:35
(3a) Set θj(Y-X) = |τ(BH
n3−j ,Y-X)| to be the number of Y-X pairs in the set BHn3−j .
Then, using the underdemanded lottery procedure with the inputs (Bh)h∈H
nj
, θj(Y-X)
and X-Y, construct a subset Sh(X-Y) one for each hospital in h ∈ Hnj .
(3b) Find a maximum allocation M jX-Y in the subgraph induced by the sets of pairs ∪h∈HjnSh(X-Y)
and τ(BH3−jn ,Y-X).
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Step 4 [Output]: Let MU = ∪j=1,2 ∪X-Y∈PU M jX-Y. Output MS ∪MR ∪MU .
We can now state our second main result.
Theorem 8.6. Let Hn be a set of hospitals. If every hospital size is strongly regular, the
truth-telling strategy profile is an (n)-Bayes-Nash equilibirum in the game induced by the
Bonus mechanism, where (n) = o(1). Furthermore for any  > 0, the efficiency loss under
the truth-telling strategy profile in almost every D(Hn) is at most µAB-Om+ µA−Bm, where
m is the number of pairs in the pool.
We conjecture that, here too, the strong regularity assumption can be relaxed and even
entirely eliminated:
Conjecture: There exists a mechanism ϕ such that the truth-telling strategy profile is an
(n)-Bayes-Nash equilibrium for (n) = o(1) in the game induced by ϕ. Furthermore under
the truth-telling strategy the efficiency loss is at most µAB-Om+µA−Bm for any  > 0, where
m is the number of pairs in the pool.
9 Conclusions and open questions
Kidney exchange in the United States has grown from being carried out rarely in only a
few hospitals, to being carried out regularly in a variety of kidney exchange networks of
hospitals, and it is presently being explored at the national level.
The National Kidney Paired Donation Pilot Program was approved by the OPTN/UNOS
Board of Directors in June 2008, and ran its first two match runs in October and December
35In order to choose the sets of underdemanded pairs of each type that will be matched we partition
the set of hospitals into two sets, each with n2 hospitals; For each set in the partition we will match the
overdemanded pairs of the hospitals in one set to the chosen underdemanded pairs of the hospitals in the
other set in order to avoid lack of independence (see also Section 6.1) and the proof of Theorem 6.3 for
further discussion.
36The size of |∪h∈HjnSh(X-Y)| will equal |τ(BH3−jn ,Y-X)| with high probability and therefore the maximum
allocation in this subgraph will match with high probability all pairs in ∪h∈HjnSh(X-Y).
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2010, with 43 patient-donor pairs in October and 62 in December, registered by kidney
exchange consortia representing 77 transplant programs. For the purposes of the present
paper it is notable that only a small fraction of the patient-donor pairs registered in the
participating hospitals were enrolled in the national pilot program.37 So the problem of full
participation by hospitals is both real and timely. It has also begun to be observed in the
active kidney exchange networks that are fully operational.
The present paper observes that one contributory cause of the lack of full participation
is that the matching algorithms currently employed in practice do not make it individually
rational for hospitals to always contribute all their patient-donor pairs. We show that, in
worst cases, this could be very costly, but we prove that in large markets it is possible to
redesign the matching mechanisms to guarantee individually rational allocations to hospitals,
at very modest cost in terms of “lost” transplants. Note that these “lost” transplants are
not really lost if instead hospitals would have withheld patient-donor pairs; on the contrary,
we show that individually rational allocations produce a big gain in transplants compared
to having hospitals withhold pairs.
To obtain analytical results about large markets we approximate them as large random
graphs whose properties we can study with limit theorems based on the classical results of
Erdos and Renyi. But we also show by simulation with clinically relevant distributions of
patients and donors that these main results apply on the scale of exchange we are presently
seeing.
However the highly interconnected compatibility graphs that we see in the limit theorems
are far from perfect approximations of the much sparser compatibility graphs we see in
practice, and this is especially true for the very most highly sensitized patients. This raises
a number of open questions that are likely to arise in practice.
The first of these questions is how to model the situation facing highly sensitized pa-
tients, who will be only sparsely connected in the compatibility graph, because they may be
compatible with a very small number of donors, even in a large graph of finite size. This
is closely related to the second question, which is how to effectively integrate nondirected
donors and chains with the cyclic exchanges that have been used initially in the national
pilot program and that are the subject of the present paper. In addition to cycles of length
k, there has been growing use of various kinds of chains in kidney exchange, and it remains
an open question how the relative importance of chains and cyclic exchanges will change as
37We hasten to note that there are many reasons other than the incentive problems discussed here
that contribute to this initial very low participation rate. These include the new bureaucratic pro-
cedures for enrolling patients, the novelty and lack of track record of the national program, the de-
sire to start small and see what happens, the exclusion of chains and nondirected donors, etc. See
http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/resources/KPDPP.asp
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the size of the pool (and the number of non-directed donors) grow large. It seems likely that,
even in large markets, chains will be especially helpful to the most highly sensitized patients
(cf. Ashlagi et al. 2010c).
A third open question is under what conditions individually rational and incentive com-
patible mechanisms exist that are as efficient as we have shown them to be under regularity
conditions on the size of hospitals. We conjecture that these regularity conditions can be
relaxed. In any case, such mechanisms could be useful in eliciting full participation in a full
scale national exchange, as it appears from simulations that hospitals are in fact of regu-
lar size (although the largest hospitals may not be strongly regular). However, our results
suggest that the benefits of a national exchange could also be realized if there was sufficient
regulatory power to require transplant centers to either participate fully or not at all, since
that would reduce the strategy space so that individual rationality would be the primary
consideration.
The final open question we raise here is how these strategic concerns would be different
in a world in which the players are not only hospitals and a (single) centralized exchange,
but in which there are multiple kidney exchange networks, some with strategic concerns of
their own. This is, of course, the situation that is currently in place.
In conclusion, as kidney exchange has grown, the strategy sets, the strategic players,
and hence the incentive constraints have changed. The new incentive issues, concerning full
participation by hospitals, arise out of the growth of kidney exchange, and are potential
obstacles to further growth. However the results of this paper strongly suggest that these
new barriers can also be overcome.
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Appendix A
9.1 Preliminaries
9.1.1 Useful Bounds
Lemma 9.1 (Chernoff and Heoffding bounds (see e.g. Alon and Spencer (2008)). Let
X1, X2, . . . , Xn be independent bernoulli random trials with Pr(Xi = 1) = p for every
i = 1, . . . , n and let X =
∑n
i=1Xi.
(i) For any δ ∈ (0, 1]
Pr (X < (1− δ)pn) < e−npδ
2
2 . (8)
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(ii) For any δ < 2e− 1
Pr (X > (1 + δ)pn) < e
−npδ2
4 . (9)
(iii) For any δ > 0
Pr (|X − E[X]| ≥ δ) < 2e−2δ
2
n . (10)
9.1.2 Proof of Lemma 5.1
For each pair type X-Y let ZX-Y(m) be the random variable that indicates the number of
X-Y pairs in D(m).
Claim 9.2. Let 0 < δ < 1 and D(m) be a random compatibility graph and consider the
following event:
Bδ(m) = {∀X-Y ∈ P , (1− δ)µX-Ym < ZX-Y(m) < (1 + δ)µX-Ym}. (11)
Then Pr [Bδ(m)] = 1− o(m−1).
Proof. Let D(m) be a random compatibility graph and let δ > 0. By the first two parts of
Lemma 9.1, for every type X-Y
Pr [ZX-Y(m) /∈ ((1− δ)mµX-Y, (1 + δ)mµX-Y)] < e
−mµX-Yδ2
4 + e
−mµX-Yδ2
2 = o(m−1).
Therefore
Pr [Bδ(m)] = 1− Pr [for some X-Y ∈ P : ZX-Y(m) /∈ ((1− δ)mµX-Y, (1 + δ)mµX-Y)] ≥
1−
∑
X-Y∈P
Pr [ZX-Y(m) /∈ ((1− δ)mµX-Y, (1 + δ)mµX-Y)] = 1− o(m−1),
where the last inequality follows since there are a finite number of pair types.
Claim 9.3. Let 0 < δ < 1
2
and let D(m) be a random compatibility graph and consider the
following event:
Sδ(m) = {|ZA-B(m)− ZB-A(m)| < m 12+δ}. (12)
Then Pr [Sδ(m)] = 1− o(m−1).
Proof. By Hoeffding’s bound (part three of Lemma 9.1),
Pr
(
ZA-B(m) ≥ E[ZA-B(m)] +m 12+δ
)
≤ e−m
2δ
2 .
Applying the same argument for B-A pairs we obtain the result.
Proof of Lemma 5.1: Let Sδ(m) and Bδ(m) be as in Claims 9.3 and 9.2. By these claims
we obtain that the probability that either Sδ(m) or Bδ(m) do not hold is o(m
−1). 2
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9.1.3 Bounded directed random graphs - definitions and Erdos-Renyi exten-
sions
In a random compatibility graph the number of pairs of each type is not fixed. We will need
Erdos-Renyi type results for random graphs in which the number of nodes as well as the
number of edges are random.
We start by defining a vector that will represent bounds on the number of nodes of
each pair type in a given subset of the compatibility graphs. For example, to represent the
subgraph induced by all A-O pairs and all O-A pairs, by Lemma 5.1 and the event Bδ(m)
we can use the vector ((1 − δ)µA-O, (1 + δ)µA-O, (1 − δ)µO-A, (1 + δ)µO-A) for some δ < 1;
in particular this vector is a tuple of coefficients for bounding from below and above the
number of A-O pairs and the number of O-A pairs in this subgraph. subgraph.
For any r > 0 a quasi-ordered vector is a vector α¯r = (α0,1, α0,2, α1,1, α1,2, . . . , αr−1,1,
αr−1,2) where αj,1 ≤ αj,2 for all 0 ≤ j < r, and α0,1 ≤ α1,1 ≤ . . . ≤, αr−1,1.38
The vector α¯r is called feasible if at most one pair type could have zero number of nodes,
that is α0,2 > 0 and for every j ≥ 1, αj,1 > 0. Let α¯r be a feasible vector. We say that
a tuple of r sets of nodes (W0, . . . ,Wr−1) are (α¯r,m)-feasible if for each 0 ≤ j < r the
interval [αj,1m,αj,2m] contains at least one integer and if the sizes of these sets are drawn
from some distribution over all possible r-tuples of integers that belong to [α0,1m,α0,2m]×
· · · × [αr−1,1m,αr−1,2m]. Note that for every sufficient large m, the interval [αj,1m,αj,2m]
contains at least one integer if an only if αj,1 < αj,2 or αj,1 = αj,2 is an integer.
Definition 9.4 (Bounded Directed Random Graphs). A graph is called a bounded directed
random graph, denoted by D(α¯1,m, p), if it is generated as follows. A (α¯1,m)-feasible set
of nodes is generated and between each two nodes v, w a directed edge is generated from v to
w with probability at least p.39
A graph is called a r-bounded directed random graph, denoted by D(α¯r,m, p), if
it is generated as follows: first r ≥ 2 distinct sets of nodes W0,W1, . . . ,Wr−1 which are
(α¯r,m)-feasible are generated. Then for each i = 0, 1, . . . , r − 1, and for each two nodes
v ∈ Wi, w ∈ Wi+1 (i is taken modulo r) a directed edge is generated from v to w with
probability at least p.
The definition of a bipartite graph can naturally be extended to a r-partite graph which
contains r sets of nodes each of size exactly m and edges are generated as in Definition 9.4.
Whenever there is no confusion we will refer also to a r-bounded directed random graph by
a r-partite graph. Note that in any r-partite graph only exchanges of size k = qr for positive
integers q are feasible. (When r = 1 we think about subgraphs induced by selfdemanded pairs
38The vector is called quasi-ordered since only the lower bounds are ordered.
39Note that for α0,1 = α0,2 = 1 the number of nodes is m.
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of some given type. When r = 2 we think about subgraphs with potential 2-way exchanges
such as O-A,A-O, and when r = 3 we think about subgraphs with potential 3-way exchanges
such as AB-O,O-A,A-AB).
Lemma 9.5. Let 0 < p < 1.
1. For any feasible vector α¯1, almost every large D(α¯1,m, p) has a nearly perfect allocation
using exchanges of size 2 (i.e. an allocation that matches all nodes but at most one),
and a perfect allocation for any k ≥ 3 (i.e. an allocation that matches all nodes).
2. Let α¯r be a feasible vector with r > 1. Almost every large D(α¯r,m, p) contains a perfect
allocation, i.e. an allocation that matches all nodes in some set Wi. Consequently, if
j′ ≤ r − 1 is the least index for which αj′,2 < αj′+1,1, then every perfect allocation
matches all nodes in some set Wi for some i ≤ j′.
Proof. Observe that is sufficient to prove the lemma for exact p since by increasing p for
some edges can only increase the probability for the existence of a (nearly) perfect allocation.
Throughout the proof we denote by 1r the positive vector with 2r 1’s (1, 1, . . . , 1).
We begin with the first part. Denote by Q the nearly perfect allocation property. Fix
some feasible vector α¯1. The proof for both k = 2 and k ≥ 3 will follow from applying the
Erdos-Renyi Theorem to non-directed random graphs.
First consider k = 2. Let pm be the probability that a nearly perfect allocation exists
in the non-directed random graph G(m, p2) (recall that this graph has exactly m nodes and
each edge is generated with probability p2). That is
pm = Pr
[
G(m, p2) |= Q] .
Consider the graph D(11,m, p). Since a cycle of length 2 has probability p
2 and because
k = 2
Pr [D(11,m, p) |= Q] = pm.
Let m(α¯1) be such that [α0,1m,α1,1m] contains an integer for every m ≥ m(α¯1). We define
a sequence (xm)m≥m(α¯1) by choosing arbitrarily the integer
xm ∈ arg min
x∈N∩[α0,1m,α1,1m]
Pr [D(11, x, p) |= Q] . (13)
Note that the minimum is attained at some value since it is taken over a finite set that
includes an integer. Therefore
Pr [D(α¯1,m, p) |= Q] ≥ Pr [D(11, xm, p) |= Q] = pxm .
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By the Erdos-Renyi Theorem since p is a constant, pxm → 1 as m→∞ completing the proof
for k = 2.
We proceed with k ≥ 3. If m is even, a perfect allocation exists using only 2-way
exchanges with probability 1 − o(1). If m is odd we pick arbitrarily m − 1 nodes. In the
graph induced by these nodes we find a perfect allocation, say M , using 2-way exchanges
(again, this can be found with probability 1−o(1)). Given that such M exists, it is sufficient
to find a couple of nodes v, w that are matched to each other in M so that the single
unmatched node can form a 3-way exchange with v and w. Such two nodes v and w cannot
be found with probability at most (1− p2)m2 , completing the first part.
The second part will follow by a reduction to a bipartite random graph followed by
application of the Erdos-Renyi Theorem. Fix a feasible vector α¯r where r > 1 and let Q
be the perfect allocation property. First consider α0,1 > 0. Note that it is enough to prove
the result for k = r, i.e. there exists a perfect allocation using exchanges of at most (hence
exact) size r.
Consider the r-partite graph D(1r,m, p) with the sets V0, V1, . . . , Vr−1 each of size exactly
m, as in Definition 9.4. For each i = 0, . . . , r − 1 and j = 1, . . . ,m let vi,j be the j-th node
in the set Vi. We construct a bipartite graph G(m,m, p
r) (as in the Erdos-Renyi Theorem)
with sets of nodes V and W as follows. Let V = V0 and for every j = 1, . . .m, let the tuple
(v1,j, v2,j, . . . , vr−1,j) be a single node in W (see Figure 9). Let
qm = Pr [G(m,m, p
r) |= Q] .
Fix some 1 ≤ j ≤ m and some v ∈ V0. Observe that the probability that D(1r,m, p)
contains the cycle v, v1,j, v2,j, . . . , vr−1,j is pr. The probability that there exists an edge
between (v1,j, v2,j, . . . , vr−1,j) and v is also pr (see Figure 9). Therefore
Pr [D(1r,m, p) |= Q] ≥ qm.
Let m(α¯r) be the least integer such that for every m ≥ m(α¯r) each interval [αj,1m,αj,2m]
contains an integer. We define a sequence (xm)m≥m(α¯r) ∈ N r of r-tuples by choosing arbi-
trarily
xm ∈ arg min
x∈Nr∩[α0,1m,α0,2m]×···×[αr−1,1m,αr−1,2m]
Pr [D(x, 1, p) |= Q] . (14)
For every m ≥ m(α¯r) let x˜m = minr−1i=0 ((xm)i). Since only increasing the sizes of sets
which are not the smallest ont increases the probability of a perfect allocation
Pr [D(x˜m, 1, p) |= Q] ≥ Pr [D(xm, 1, p)] .
Therefore
Pr [D(α¯r,m, p) |= Q] ≥ Pr [D(xm, 1, p) |= Q] ≥ qxm .
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Figure 9: The graph on the left is a directed 3-partite graph and the reduction to a bipartite
graph works as follows. We arbitrarily join nodes j and j′ into a single node (for each
j = 1, 2, 3) in the reduced graph. An edge in the reduced graph corresponds to a cycle in
the 3-partite graph but not vice versa, for example the cycle a,1’,2 has no “representative”
edge in the reduced graph.
As in the first part, qxm → 1 as m → ∞. Therefore almost every D(α¯r,m, p) contains a
perfect allocation. Denote by W0,W1, . . . ,Wr−1 the sets of pairs in each part in D(α¯r,m, p).
It remains to prove the result for α0,1 = 0. Consider the sequence of realized sets
Wm0 ,W
m
1 , . . . ,W
m
r−1. for m ≥ m(α¯r). We partition this sequence into two subsequences,
one (xmj) in which W
m
0 = min(|Wm0 |, |Wm1 |, . . . , |Wmr−1|) and the other (ymj) in which which
Wm0 > min(|Wm0 |, |Wm1 |, . . . , |Wmr−1|). For the latter subsequence the proof is similar to the
case α0,1 > 0. We need to show that the probability for the existence of a perfect allocation
converges to one in subsequence (xmj). Note that if W0 would have been the same size
as the second smallest set in each element in the sequence again the same proof would
follow. Therefore, the proof follows by observing that if a r-partite graph contains a perfect
allocation, it also contains one after removing some nodes from W0.
9.2 Proof of Proposition 5.2
The proof is by construction. Let D(m) be a random compatibility graph. We need to
show that an allocation with the properties described in the proposition exists in D(m) with
probability 1− o(1). Let δ be a constant such that 0 < δ < min{1−2.5γ¯
1+2.5γ¯
, 0.01, γ¯
100
}.
LetBδ(m) and Sδ(m) be the events defined in (11) and (12) respectively. Since Pr [Bδ(m)] =
1−o(m−1) we will assume throughout the proof that the events Bδ(m) and Sδ(m) occur (we
will the probability that either one of these events does not occur towards non-existence of
a desired allocation). Let V be the set of realized pairs in D(m). While we assume that the
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type of pair is realized we assume that the edges are yet to be realized.
Claim 9.6. 1. With probability 1− o(1) there exists a perfect allocation using only 2-way
or 3-way exchanges in the subgraph induced by only selfdemanded pairs.
2. With probability 1−o(1) there exists a perfect allocation in the subgraph induced by only
A-B and B-A pairs. In particular either all A-B pairs or all B-A pairs are matched
under such an allocation.
Proof. Since Bδ(m) occurs, for every selfdemanded type X-X the subgraph induced by only
X-X pairs is a bounded directed graph, D(((1− δ)µX-X, (1 + δ)µX-X),m, γH). Therefore the
first part follows by the first part of Lemma 9.5.
Similarly the graph induced by only A-B and B-A pairs is a 2-bounded directed graph,
D(((1− δ)µA-B, (1 + δ)µA-B, (1− δ)µB-A, (1 + δ)µB-A),m, γH). Hence the second part follows
by the second part of Lemma 9.5.
Let M1 be an allocation in V that satisfies both parts of Claim 9.6. We will assume
that such M1 exists, and count the low probability it doesn’t towards failure of the de-
sired allocation to exist. Further assume that M1 matches all B-A pairs, and in particular
ZA-B(m) ≥ ZB-A(m) (the proof proceeds similarly if all B-A pairs are matched).
Let V ′ be the set of pairs that are not matched by M1 in V . In particular V ′ contains all
overdemanded pairs, underdemanded pairs and the A-B pairs that are not matched by M1.
The next Claim shows that all A-B pairs that are not matched by M1 can be matched as in
the hypothesis. Recall that for a set of pairs S and type t, τ(S, t) denotes the set of pairs in
S whose type is t.
Claim 9.7. With probability 1 − o(1) there exists a perfect allocation in the subgraph in-
duced by the sets of pairs τ(V ′,A-B), τ(V ′,B-O) and τ(V ′,O-A), which matches all pairs in
τ(V ′,A-B).
Proof. Let α¯3 = (0, 2δµA−B, (1 − δ)µB-O, (1 + δ)µB-O, (1 − δ)µO-A, (1 + δ)µO-A). Since both
Bδ(m) and Sδ(m) occur the subgraph induced by the pairs in the statement is a 3-bounded
directed random graph D(α¯3,m, γH), and the result follows by the second part of Lemma
9.5.
Let M2 be a perfect allocation as in Claim 9.7 (again assuming it exists). By Lemma 5.1
the size of of this allocation is o(m).
As the hypothesis suggests we wish to match every AB-O pair in a 3-way exchange using
one O-A pair and one A-AB pair (see Figure 3). Furthermore we need to match every other
overdemanded pair X-Y in a 2-way to a Y-X pair. Although we have already used some
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O-A pairs in M2, the following claim shows that there are sufficiently many O-A pairs that
are not matched by M2 that can be used in order to match all A-O and AB-O pairs as we
have just described. Similarly there are sufficiently many A-AB pairs to match all AB-A
and AB-O pairs.
Claim 9.8. 1. ZO-A(m) ≥ (1 + δ)m(µA-O + µAB-O) + λm for some λ > 0.
2. ZA-AB(m) ≥ (1 + δ)m(µAB-A + µAB-O).
Proof. Recall that 1
ρ
is the probability that an arbitrary patient and an arbitrary donor are
incompatible. since Bδ(m) occurs
ZO-A(m) ≥ µO-A(1− δ)m = ρµOµA(1− δ)m > ρµOγ¯(µA + µAB)(1 + δ)m,
where the last inequality follows since µAB < µA, and δ <
1−2.5γ¯
1+2.5γ¯
< 1−2γ¯
1+2γ¯
, completing the first
part. to see that the second part follows note that
ZA-AB(m) ≥ µA-AB(1− δ)m = ρµAµAB(1− δ)m > ρµABγ¯(µO + µA)(1 + δ)m,
where the last inequality follows because µO + µA < 2.5µA (see Assumption B and Footnote
21) and δ < 1−2.5γ¯
(1+2.5γ¯)
.
Let M ′ = M1∪M2 and let V ′′ be the set of all pairs that are not matched by M ′. Consider
the subgraph induced by the sets of pairs τ(V ′,AB-O), τ(V ′,O-A) and τ(V ′,A-AB). Observe
that this graph is a 3-bounded directed random graph; indeed by Claim 9.8 there exist
constants c1 and c2 such that the number of pairs in in τ(V
′,A-AB) and τ(V ′,AB-O) is at
least c1m and c2m. Therefore by Lemma 9.5 with high probability there exists a perfect
allocation that will match all AB-O pairs will be matched.
To complete the construction it remains to show that for every overdemanded type X-Y
except AB-O the graph induced by all X-Y and Y-X pairs that are not yet matched contains
a perfect allocation exchanges of size 2. This follows from similar arguments as above.
It remains to show that one cannot obtain more transplants by allowing exchanges of
size more than 3. Let e be an exchange of any size and let τ(e,X-Y) be the set of pairs in e
whose type is X-Y. It is enough to show that∑
t∈PU
τ(e, t)| ≤ 2|τ(e,AB-O)|+
∑
t∈PO\{AB-O}
|τ(e, t)| (15)
We say that a pair v helps pair y if the there is either a directed edge from v to w or there is
a directed path v, z1, z2, . . . , zr, w where each zi, i ≥ r is a selfdemanded pair. Observe that
every underdemanded O-X pair must be helped by some overdemanded Y-O pair. Similarly
any underdemanded pair X-AB must help an overdemanded pair AB-Y pair. Finally since
an O-X underdemanded pair can help an underdemanded pair Y-AB but not vice versa, we
obtain the bound. 2
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9.3 Individual Rationality and the Proof of Theorem 6.2:
Before we prove Theorem 6.2 it will be useful to write Claims 9.2 and 9.3 with respect to
D(Hn) rather than D(m). We will need to rewrite the events (11) and (12) accordingly.
Lemma 9.9. Let 0 < δ < 1
2
and let Hn = {1, . . . , n}. Moreover let χHn be a random variable
which denotes the size of all hospitals, that is χHn =
∑
h∈Hn |Vh|. Consider the events
Wδ(Hn) = {∀X-Y ∈ P , (1− δ)µ X-YχHn < |τ(VHn ,X-Y)| < (1 + δ)µX-YχHn}, (16)
and
Sδ(Hn) = {||τ(VHn ,A-B)| − |τ(VHn ,B-A)|| = o(n)}. (17)
If every hospital h ∈ Hn is of a positive and bounded size then
Pr [Wδ(Hn), Sδ(Hn)] = 1− o(1). (18)
9.3.1 Proof of Theorem 6.2:
Let D(Hn) be a random compatibility graph with the set of hospitals Hn. We prove the
result for the case in which each hospital has the same regular size c ≤ c¯. The proof for the
general case is similar (using the fact that the size of each hospital is bounded).
Let RHS(1) and LHS(1) be the the right hand side and left hand side of inequality (1)
respectively (see Definition 6.4). Fix δ > 0 such that δ < min(RHS(1)−LHS(1), 0.01, γ¯
100
).
We assume that both events Wδ(Hn) and Sδ(Hn) as defined in (16) and (17) respectively
occur and count the low probability it doesn’t towards failure for the existence of an allocation
with the properties described in the theorem. Lemma 6.5 is a key step in the proof.
Proof of Lemma 6.5:
One way to construct a satisfiable set Sn would be to first (i) choose randomly for each
hospital a maximum set of underdemanded pairs it can internally match (by regularity
and law of large numbers this will satisfy the first property of Definition 6.4), and (ii) add
arbitrary pairs of each underdemanded type so that the second property of Definition 6.4 is
satisfied.
Suppose Sn is constructed as above. We want to show that with high probability for
each underdemanded type X-Y∈ PU a perfect allocation exists in the subgraph induced by
τ(Sn,X-Y) and the overdemanded pairs in τ(VHn ,Y-X). Unfortunately Lemma 9.5 cannot
be directly applied since these graphs are not 2-bounded directed random graph due to lack
of independence of each edge in the graph (recall that we already have partial information
on internal edges after phase (i) of the process above). Although it is true that with high
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probability such a perfect allocation exists we use a slightly more subtle construction for a
satisfiable set.
Instead we will partition the set of hospitals into two sets H1n and H
2
n each with
n
2
hospitals, and find a satisfiable set Sn such that (i) the number of underdemanded pairs of
each type X-Y in Sn belonging to H
1
n (H
2
n) equals the number of overdemanded pairs Y-X
belonging to H2n (H
1
n). Then we will match overdemanded pairs of type Y-X H
1
n (H
2
n) to
X-Y underdemanded pairs in Sn belonging to H
2
n (H
1
n), using the observation that these
subgraphs are 2-uniform directed random graphs.
For every hospital h ∈ Hn, let Mh be a random allocation that maximizes the number of
underdemanded pairs in the subgraph induced by its set of pairs Vh. For simplicity we will
assume throughout the proof that n is even. We partition the set of hospitals into two sets
H1n = {1, . . . , n2} and H2n = {n2 + 1, . . . , n}. Define for each j = 1, 2
Sjn = ∪h∈Hjnτ(Mh(Vh),PU). (19)
and let S = S1n∪S2n. By construction S satisfies the first property in Definition 6.4. Consider
the following events for j = 1, 2:
Qjn = {∀X-Y ∈ PU , |τ(Sjn,X-Y)| < (1− δ)µY-X
n
2
c}.
By the regularity assumption and the law of large numbers Pr[Qjn] = 1 − o(1) for both
j = 1, 2, and therefore Pr[Q1n, Q
2
n] = 1− o(1).
Consider the events Wδ(H
j
n) for each j = 1, 2, where Wδ(H
j
n) is defined as in (16). Since
the size of each Hjn is
n
2
, from Lemma 9.9 and the fact that there are only two sets in the
partition with probability 1− o(1) both Wδ(H1n) and Wδ(H2n) occur.
Therefore with probability 1− o(1) for each j = 1, 2
|τ(Sjn,X-Y)| < |τ(VH3−jn ,Y-X)|. (20)
Finally for each j = 1, 2 we add to Sjn arbitrary underdemanded pairs belonging to H
j
n such
that (20) becomes an equality for every X-Y∈ PU ; Observe that this is feasible by applying
Lemma 5.1 for n
2
hospitals. By construction Sn = S
1
n ∪ S2n is a satisfiable set.
Let X-Y∈ PU be an arbitrary type and consider the subgraph induced by the sets of
pairs τ(S1n,X-Y) and τ(VH2n ,X-Y). Note that this is 2-bounded directed random graph (the
realization of each edge is independent of the internal allocations Mh for each h since all
potential edges in this graph are not internal). Therefore there is perfect matching in this
graph with probability 1 − o(1). Similarly, a perfect allocation exists with high probability
in the graph induced by the sets of pairs τ(S2n,X-Y) and τ(VH1n ,X-Y). Finally since there
are a finite number of types the proof follows.2
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Let M1 be a perfect allocation as in Lemma 6.5. We assume that such M1 exists, again
assuming that with the failure probability no allocation with the desired properties exists.
So far M1 matches twice the number of overdemanded pairs in the graph, including for
each hospital h the number of underdemanded pairs each h can internally match. As in
the proof of Proposition 5.2 there exists a perfect allocation in the subgraph induced by all
selfdemanded pairs with probability 1− o(1), say M2.
Finally we will show that there exists a perfect allocation in the subgraph induced by all
A-B and B-A pairs which matches for each hospital at least the same number of A-B and
B-A pairs it can internally match.
For each hospital there exist probabilities A-B > 0 and B-A > 0 not depending on n
for not matching all their A-B and B-A pairs respectively. Therefore there exists  > 0 not
depending on n such that with probability 1 − o(1) the number of A-B pairs that cannot
be internally matched is at least n and the expected number of B-A pairs that cannot be
internally matched is at least n, i.e linear in n.
However by Lemma 5.1 the difference between the number of A-B and B-A pairs is
sublinear with high probability, that is, with probability 1− o(1)
||τ(VHn ,A-B)| − |τ(VHn ,B-A)|| = o(n). (21)
Suppose that |τ(VHn ,A-B)| > |τ(VHn ,B-A)| (the proof proceeds similarly if the converse
inequality holds). By (21), with probability 1−o(1) there exists W ⊆ τ(VHn ,A-B) such that
(i) |W | = |τ(VHn ,B-A)| and (ii) for each hospital h, W contains at least the number of A-B
pairs it can internally match.
Using similar arguments as in the proof of Lemma 6.5 there exists with high probability
a perfect allocation in the graph induced by the sets of pairs W and τ(VHn ,B-A), say M3.
It remains to bound the efficiency loss, which will follow from Proposition 5.2. We
consider an efficient allocation M ′ as in Proposition 5.2 and let M = M1 ∪M2 ∪M3. In
both M and M ′ all selfdemanded pairs are matched. M matches each AB-O pair in a 2-
way exchange to an O-AB pair rather than carrying out a 3-way exchange as in M ′. In
both allocations M and M ′ after excluding all exchanges in which an AB-O pairs is part
of, all overdemanded pairs are matched and the same number of underdemanded pairs are
matched. Finally by (21) M leaves o(n) A-B or B-A pairs unmatched matched whereas M ′
matches all A-B and B-A pairs. 2
9.4 Proof of Theorem 8.6:
Let Hn be a set of bounded and strongly regular sized hospitals and let H
1
n and H
2
n be as in
the theorem, i.e. a partition of Hn to two sets of hospitals each of size
n
2
. For simplicity we
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will assume that all hospitals have the same size c > 0.40 Fix some hospital h¯ ∈ Hn and fix
Vh¯ to be the set of pairs (type) of hospital h¯. Without loss of generality assume that h¯ ∈ H1n.
We assume that all hospitals but h¯ report truthfully their set of incompatible pairs.
Denote by ϕ the Bonus mechanism. We need to show that for any subset of pairs Bh¯ ⊆ Vh¯
EV−h [u(ϕ(Vh¯, V−h)] ≥ EV−h [u(ϕ(Bh¯, V−h)]− o(1). (22)
Let RHS(7) and LHS(7) be the the right hand side and left hand side of inequality (7)
respectively (see Definition 8.5). Fix δ > 0 such that δ < min(RHS(7)−LHS(7), 0.01). We
assume that the events Wδ(H
1
n), Wδ(H
2
n), Wδ(Hn) and Sδ(Hn) as defined in (16) and (17)
occur and as usual count the low probability they don’t towards failure of the existence of
an allocation as constructed in the Bonus mechanism.41
The following claim will imply that the strategic problem of each hospital roughly comes
down to to maximizing its expected number of matched underdemanded pairs.
Claim 9.10. If h¯ reports truthfully Vh¯, all its non-underdemanded pairs that can be internally
matched will be matched by ϕ with probability 1− o(1).
Proof. As in the proof of Theorem 5.2, in almost every graph there exists a perfect allocation
within the set of all selfdemanded pairs, thus Step 1 of the mechanism ϕ will find a perfect
allocation with probability 1− o(1). (Here and below a little bit of care has to be taken to
verify that the results about uniform directed random graphs hold even when the internal
subgraph of a single hospital h¯ of bounded size c is fixed in advance.42) Using the same
arguments as in the proof of Theorem 6.2 to match A-B and B-A pairs, we obtain in Step 2
of the Bonus mechanism, with probability 1− o(1) a perfect allocation will be found in the
graph induced by A-B and B-A pairs that matches all A-B and B-A that can be internally
matched. Finally similarly to Lemma 6.5 all overdemanded pairs will be matched in Step 3
(to underdemanded pairs) with probability 1 − o(1). Since there are only 3 steps and they
are all independent of one another the result follows.
For any Bh¯ ⊆ Vh¯ and any underdemanded type X-Y ∈ PU . Denote by ψX-Y(Bh¯) the
expected number of X-Y pairs in Vh¯ that will be matched when h¯ reports Bh¯ (both by the
mechanism ϕ and, in the second stage, by h¯).
40Again, since all hospitals are of bounded size a similar proof follows (one needs ca neglect sizes appear
a finite number of times).
41Note that the internal graph of hospital h¯ is not a random variable since it is fixed. However, Lemma
9.9 still holds since the size of h¯ is bounded and does not affect the number of pairs in the limit. We skip
here the formal details.
42Note that in the compatibility graph, with probability bounded away from zero some hospital has the
same internal graph as h¯.
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Fix an arbitrary subset Bh¯ ⊆ Vh¯ and an arbitrary underdemanded type X-Y∈ PU . To
see that (22) holds, by Claim 9.10 it is sufficient to show that
ψX-Y(Bh¯) ≤ ψX-Y(Vh¯) + o(1). (23)
The following lemma allow us to assume that all X-Y pairs belonging to h¯ that are chosen
in the underdemanded lottery will be matched:
Claim 9.11. All X-Y pairs chosen by the underdemanded lottery will be matched by ϕ with
probability 1− o(1), regardless of whether Bh¯ or Vh¯ are reported.
Proof. Suppose h¯ reports Bh¯ (since Bh¯ is arbitrary all arguments in the proof hold also if
h¯ reports Vh¯). Recall that Sh(X-Y) is the set of X-Y pairs belonging to h that are chosen
in the underdemanded lottery, and recall that θj(Y-X) = |τ(BH
n3−j ,Y-X)| for each j = 1, 2
(see Step (3a) in the Bonus mechanism).
By our assumption every hospital is strongly regular (see Definition 6.4). Therefore, by
the law of large numbers and since h¯ is of bounded size, with probability 1 − o(1) for each
j = 1, 2 ∑
h∈Hjn
|Sh(X-Y)| < θj(Y-X).43
Therefore with high probability the underdemanded lottery will enter the Main Step of
the underdemanded lottery.44.
SinceWδ(H
1
n) andWδ(H
2
n) occur θj(Y-X) < |τ(BHn3−j ,X-Y)| and θ3−j(Y-X) < |τ(BHn3−j ,X-Y)|
for each j = 1, 2. Hence, for each j = 1, 2 the size of ∪h∈HjnSh(X-Y) at the end of the under-
demanded lottery is the same size as the number of reported Y-X pairs by all hospitals in
H3−jn .
In particular each of the two subgraphs containing X-Y and Y-X pairs considered in step
(3b) of the bonus mechanism is a 2-bounded directed random graph (here we used that
nodes on each side of a graph cannot belong to the same hospital and therefore we still
have independence of each edge). Therefore, by Lemma 9.5 both these subgraphs contain a
perfect allocation with probability 1− o(1) and by construction all X-Y pairs in these graph
will be matched with probability 1− o(1).
From this point on we will assume that all X-Y pairs chosen by the underdemanded
lottery all end up matched (again counting the failure probability towards failing to match
all underdemanded pairs of hospital h¯ that are chosen in the underdemanded lottery).
43We don’t know if |Bh¯| is a strongly regular size, but since it is only one bounded hospital the inquality
holds.
44Again, we neglect formalizing that hospital h¯’s set is fixed and not a random variable
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By the Main Step of the underdemanded lottery, adding imaginary X-Y pairs to Bh¯ (i.e.
not from Vh¯ \ Bh¯) can only increase ψX-Y(Bh¯). We will add g new X-Y pairs to the set Bh¯
assuming that each of these new pairs cannot be internally matched by h¯, where
g = |τ(Vh¯,X-Y)| − |τ(Bh¯,X-Y)|.
Note that g ≥ 0, and with a slight abuse of notation we refer from now on to Bh¯ as the
extended set containing the imaginary pairs. We need to show that (23) holds.
Let q and q˜ be the number of X-Y pairs h¯ can match internally in Vh¯ and Bh¯ respectively.
Observe that q˜ ≤ q ≤ |τ(Vh¯,X-Y)|. We will assume that q < |τ(Vh¯,X-Y)|, otherwise (23) is
satisfied since all pairs in τ(Vh¯,X-Y) will be matched by ϕ.
Consider the Main Step in the under demanded lottery; When h¯ reports Vh¯, each ball in
J belonging to h¯ is drawn with some identical probability p > 0. Similarly when h¯ reports
Bh¯ each ball in J belonging to h¯ is drawn with some identical probability p˜ > 0. Since the
number of X-Y pairs and Y-X belonging to h¯ is bounded and the total number of X-Y and
Y-X pairs in the pool approaches infinity
p˜ = p+ o(1). (24)
We set z = |τ(Vh¯,X-Y)| and consider the case that h¯ reports Vh¯. In the initialization
step of the underdemanded lottery, Sh¯(X-Y) is initialized to contain exactly q X-Y pairs of
h¯, and in the Main step of the lottery, for each one of h¯’s that is drawn, an additional X-Y
pair belonging to h¯ is added to Sh¯(X-Y) as long as there are remaining X-Y pairs in Vh¯.
Therefore since h¯ has at most z − q additional X-Y pairs (to the initial q ones)
ψX-Y(Vh¯) = q +
z−q−1∑
j=1
j
(
z
j
)
pj(1− p)z−j + (z − q)
z∑
j=z−q
(
z
j
)
pj(1− p)z−j. (25)
Consider now the case that h¯ reports Bh¯. Again, the initialized set Sh¯(X-Y) contains q˜ X-Y
pairs, and for each of h¯’s balls that is drawn in the Main Step, an additional X-Y pair is
added to Sh¯(X-Y) (as long as it has such remaining in Bh¯). Recall that we assumed that all
pairs Sh¯(X-Y) at the end of the lottery will be matched by the mechanism ϕ.
Since h¯ hasn’t reported all its pairs, it can still use pairs in Vh¯ \Bh¯ in exchanges to match
X-Y pairs in τ(Vh¯,X-Y) \ Sh¯(X-Y). By definition of q and the initialization of Sh¯(X-Y), h¯
cannot match more than an additional q− q˜ X-Y pairs that the mechanism hasn’t matched.
Therefore
ψX-Y(Bh¯) ≤ q˜+
z−q˜−1∑
j=1
min(j+q−q˜, z−q˜)
(
z
j
)
p˜j(1−p˜)z−j+(z−q˜)
z∑
j=z−q˜
(
z
j
)
p˜j(1−p˜)z−j, (26)
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where the second term on the right hand side follows since if j balls are drawn from J , h¯ can
match at most an additional q− q˜ X-Y pairs, and altogether not more than z− q˜ additional
X-Y pairs to the first q˜ pairs.
Since z, p and q˜ are all bounded, by (24) we can replace p˜ with p in the right hand side
of (26) and add o(1). Therefore
ψX-Y(Bh¯) ≤ q˜+
z−q˜−1∑
j=1
(
z
j
)
pj(1−p)z−j min(j+q−q˜, z−q˜)+(z−q˜)
z∑
j=z−q˜
(
z
j
)
pj(1−p)z−j+o(1).
(27)
Since z − q˜ ≥ z − q
ψX-Y(Bh¯) ≤ q˜ +
z−q−1∑
j=1
(
z
j
)
pj(1− p)z−j(j + q − q˜) + (z − q˜)
z∑
j=z−q
(
z
j
)
pj(1− p)z−j + o(1) =
q˜+
z−q−1∑
j=1
j
(
z
j
)
pj(1−p)z−j+(q−q˜)
z−q−1∑
j=1
(
z
j
)
pj(1−p)z−j+(z−q+q−q˜)
z∑
j=z−q
(
z
j
)
pj(1−p)z−j+o(1) ≤
ψX-Y(Vh¯) + o(1),
where the last inequality follows by (25) and since (q − q˜)∑zj=1 (zj)pj(1− p)z−j ≤ q − q˜. We
have shown that inequality (23) is satisfied.
To see that the bound on the efficiency loss holds under the truth-telling strategy profile,
note that the allocation constructed by ϕ has the same size/properties as the one constructed
in the proof of Theorem 6.3, implying the result. 2
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